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A central insight in economic sociology is that firms depend on relationships with 
other organizations for their access to capital, information, and other resources. Such 
interactions among firms tend to develop into stable networks of social and economic 
exchange that stratify firms in an industry. My dissertation contributes to our 
understanding of emergent industry structures by explaining how firms build their 
networks during the early history of a new sector. First, I propose that firms in young 
industries are exposed to multiple institutional pressures from professional groups, policy 
makers, neighboring industries, and trade associations. Second, I argue that institutional 
pressures shape firms‘ collaborative strategies. Finally, I claim that firms are not 
uniformly affected by institutional pressures, since they typically differ in their exposure 
to different collaborative practices and beliefs. I find empirical support for these claims in 
a multi-method study of the U.S. venture capital industry during its formative years 1965-
1988. The empirical results highlight that a young industry can develop along many 
different trajectories. Understanding how firms historically were affected by different 






CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
A central insight in the field of economic sociology is that firms in many 
industries are deeply embedded in collaborative relationships with other organizations. 
Granovetter (1985) asserted long ago that such networks of social and economic 
exchange explain why some firms develop trust in each other and reciprocal interactions, 
whereas other firms engage in fierce conflict and competition. This idea about 
interdependencies between firms has spurred much sociological research over the past 
three decades. Today, we know that firms among other things use their connections to 
other organizations to secure scarce resources and valuable information (Burt 1992; 
Pfeffer and Salancik 1978), to develop new products and technologies (Ahuja 2000a; 
Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996), and to attract the interest of important third 
parties such as financial investors (Podolny 2001; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels 1999). 
Networks stratify firms in an industry (White 2002) by bringing opportunities to some 
organizations, while restricting the options of others (Uzzi 1996). 
Sociologists working in this theoretical tradition were initially excited to find that 
the configuration of network structures could explain practices and processes across a 
wide range of empirical settings irrespectively of the content and context of the network 
connections (e.g. Burt 1992). Nevertheless while this idea about universal effects has 
generated much groundbreaking work, it has more recently come under scrutiny by 





wave of research about network contingencies teaches us that patterns of inter-
organizational relations and their effects often are contextual: they depend on the broader 
set of social structures that exist in an industry. Recent empirical studies have 
documented that network structures and the benefits that firms can derive from them 
varies across industries (Rosenkopf and Schilling 2007), regions (Owen-Smith and 
Powell 2004; Saxenian 1994; Whittington, Owen-Smith, and Powell 2009), countries 
(Hamilton and Biggart 1988; Xiao and Tsui 2007) and time (Gulati and Higgins 2003; 
Mizruchi, Stearns, and Marquis 2006; Powell, White, Koput, and Owen-Smith 2005). 
Granovetter captured this idea nicely already in his classic 1985 paper by noting that 
―networks of social relations penetrate irregularly and in differing degrees in different 
sectors of economic life, thus allowing for what we already know: distrust, opportunism, 
and disorder are by no means absent‖ (p. 491).  
Three important ideas extend from these works by Granovetter and other scholars. 
First, the literature shows that is possible that the collaborative relations among firms are 
not as ubiquitous as many sociological studies about networks implicitly assume. If 
networks ―penetrate irregularly‖, there may well be contexts or times with weaker 
interdependencies between firms. Second, these studies indicate that it is plausible that 
not all firms value and approach collaborative ties with other organizations in the same 
manner. Indeed the recent work about network contingencies as well as Granovetter‘s 
claim in the 1985 paper open up the idea that the very meaning of collaboration may be 
differently defined in different social settings. And third, the literature points to the idea 
that variation in meaning is consequential. The literature suggests that shifts in meaning 





In the present dissertation, I build on these ideas to investigate how institutional 
pressures shape firms‘ understandings of collaboration. The term institutional mechanism 
refers broadly to the role of professional groups, policy-makers, trade associations, and 
other institutional bodies in channeling, transforming, and building beliefs in an industry 
for how firms should interact with each other. The approach that I am taking focuses 
especially on the effects of institutional pressures during the early days of an industry. 
Despite the widely held belief in the sociological literature that industry structures 
develop along path dependent trajectories (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; White 1981), 
researchers have so far paid limited attention to how firms in new sectors approach other 
organizations and evaluate opportunities to collaborate with partners. As a result of this 
gap in the literature, we know surprisingly little about the initial conditions that start 
evolutionary paths and give rise to certain industry structures. 
My work starts from the sociological insight that new industries are far from 
blank slates when it comes to social structures (Stark 1996). By following this insight and 
attending to institutional processes during the early days of an industry, I explain how 
firms and other interest groups in an industry seek to influence the institutional context 
that govern firms‘ interactions with each other (Chapter 2), and what implications 
institutional pressures have on the collaborative relations that organizations forge with 
each other (Chapter 3 and 4). In doing so, I offer a theoretical account that stresses that 
collaboration networks can develop in many different directions. Firms that today are 
embedded in cohesive networks could well have avoided close relations with other 
organizations if the institutional dynamics during the early history of the industry had 





understanding of how and why firms collaborate with each other and develop the level of 
trust and reciprocity that Granovetter and many other sociologists take as crucial for 
realizing more complex forms of exchanges. 
To unpack this argument, I present in this dissertation three empirical papers 
situated in the context of small business financing. My focus is on the venture capital 
industry which today is an important funding source for start-up companies, especially 
those with strong growth potential (Gompers and Lerner 1999). Yet the sustainability of 
this industry and its structures were for a long time questioned by policy-makers and 
practitioners alike (see e.g. Noone and Rubel 1970). In the 1960s, booming stock markets 
and new regulations spurred increased interest in small business investments, and the 
venture capital industry – as we know it today – started to take shape. Venture capital 
firms developed a new model for financing small businesses characterized by a focus on 
high technology targets, equity stakes, and relatively high levels of engagement and 
control in the firms that they invested. They further did so by working closely with other 
competing venture capital firms. My dissertation examines how venture capital firms 
developed these models for how to interact with entrepreneurs and other financiers during 
a formative period of their industry between 1965 and 1988. Understanding the formation 
of these networks of inter-firm relations is important, since these networks are central to 
the venture capital industry‘s ability to contribute to innovation and economic growth. 
In the reminder of this chapter, I outline the overarching argument of my 
dissertation. I begin with a review of theories on network evolution to show how my 
work extends current sociological knowledge. Next I turn to institutional approaches in 





practices in young industries. I conclude with an overview of my empirical context and 
the three papers that are at the core of my dissertation. 
Collaboration among Firms in Young Industries 
As already proposed, network scholars have so far paid very limited attention to 
the special nature of inter-firm collaboration in young industries. Indeed network theories 
were until recently criticized for their excessively abstract and acontextual treatment of 
social structures (DiMaggio 1992; Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Krippner 2001; Sewell 
1992). The best account that we currently have about how and why firms decide to forge 
ties with each other in young industries comes from the literature on network evolution. 
This literature justifies the importance of focusing on young industries to understand 
collaboration among firms; yet curiously these theories offer very limited insights into the 
development of networks in such novel contexts. 
An important message from the literature about network evolution is that firms 
make decisions about collaboration under a range of social constraints. While some 
studies conceptualize networks as means to fulfill a firm‘s strategic needs including 
uncertainty reduction and access to information and other resources (Burt 1992; 
Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996; Ozcan and Eisenhardt 2009; Pfeffer and Salancik 
1978), firms often face important limitations in their ability to form relations with desired 
partners (Ahuja 2000b). Social constraints stem from several different sources. One line 
of research has emphasized that a firm‘s current network positions influence the 
likelihood that the firm forge new collaborative relations with other firms. These studies 





(Gulati 1994; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Obstfeld 2005; Walker, Kogut, and Shan 1997). 
Another branch of this literature shows that firms that are located close in physical space 
are more likely to work with each other (Sorenson and Stuart 2001). For example, 
Saxenian‘s comparative study of Silicon Valley and Route 128 in Massachusetts 
demonstrates that spatial clusters of interconnected firms result from fluid labor markets, 
dense informal networks, and local trade associations (Saxenian 1994). Finally, research 
on contextual influences has long stressed the impact of norms on the formation of 
network ties. Macaulay (1963) has proposed that business relations are influenced by 
informal understandings that help firms to make sense of situations that are not regulated 
by formal contracts. More recent work has shown that social control supports the 
development of trust between firms, which in turn enables the formation of exchange 
relations (Larson 1992). This perspective is for instance found in research on Asian 
business groups which suggests that culturally sustained practices explain differences in 
national network trajectories (Granovetter 1994; Hamilton and Biggart 1988). 
All of these studies share the idea that the pattern of collaboration that exists in an 
industry changes slowly. Existing inter-organizational relations, geographic proximity, 
and social norms sustain and reinforce network structures over time. We can thus think 
about networks as path dependent structures where the formation of new collaborative 
ties between firms depend on a history of prior decisions. White (1981) makes this point 
explicit in his well-known analysis of industry structures. He argues that markets need to 
be understood as cliques of interconnected firms. Market structures, once they are set in 
place, tend to be highly stable since firms have limited incentives and opportunities to 





organizations. Recently, Stark and Vedres (2006) have argued that networks are best 
represented as structural pathways. Each firm in a market moves over time through a 
sequence of network positions that shape the firm‘s performance.  
Interestingly this focus on historical trajectories leaves us with new unanswered 
questions. While prior sociological studies predominately have examined the slow 
incremental evolution of networks in mature industries, they suggest implicitly that 
young industries are particularly fruitful settings for understanding how networks form. 
Central to the idea about path dependencies is the argument that initial phases of a 
process are important since small decisions made during that time tend to guide 
subsequent decisions (e.g. Goldstone 1998; Mahoney 2000; Pierson 2000). Current 
theories have however paid limited attention to the factors that explain firms‘ 
collaborative decisions during such early phases, leaving us without an account for how 
evolutionary trajectories start. This gap in the literature is critical since the idea about 
path dependencies suggest that small initial differences are amplified over time due to 
learning effect and complementarities. Because the literature on networks offer limited 
insights about the processes that shape firms‘ collaborative decisions in these contexts, I 
turn next to literature in the field of organization theory where the social dynamic of 
young industries is an important research topic. 
Institutional Mechanisms and Networks in Young Industries 
Researchers in the broader field of organizational theory have long recognized 
that firms in young industries face a different set of opportunities and challenges than 





by organizational ecologists and institutional scholars. Organizational ecologists propose 
that firms in young industries often struggle to make other organizations familiar with 
their practices (Aldrich and Fiol 1994). Before the industry becomes widely viewed as a 
recognized and legitimate market niche, organizations try out several business models, 
often without success (Hannan and Carroll 1992). Similarly institutional scholars have 
suggested that organizations in novel fields tend to explore multiple, and sometimes 
competing, ideas for how to organize their activities before institutions push 
organizations to move towards shared standards (DiMaggio 1991; Leblebici, Salancik, 
Copay, and King 1991). Both of these literatures emphasize the key point advocated in 
this dissertation: young industries are highly dynamic contexts where firms often explore 
a multitude of ideas for how to build their businesses and how to interact with other 
firms. To understand how firms in a young industry develop and approach collaborative 
ideas, we need to pay attention to the social mechanisms that make some alternatives 
more attractive than others. 
This question is familiar to researchers within organization theory. Scholars in 
this research area have presented several theoretical claims to explain the emergence and 
diffusion of practices and strategies (Davis and Greve 1997; Tolbert and Zucker 1983), 
and recently arguments that explain firms‘ resistance to adopt new ideas (Fiss and Zajac 
2004; Marquis and Lounsbury 2007). In young industries, we can expect that several 
institutional mechanisms shape beliefs about appropriateness and efficiency. Institutions 
are durable meaning systems that shape perceptions and practices in a field (Jepperson 
1991; Scott 2008). My empirical analyses will emphasize especially the role of 





in shaping beliefs for how firms in a new field ought to interact with each other. Some 
empirical examples from the existing literature will demonstrate the theoretical 
implications that extend from this argument.  
Consider for example Dobbin and Dowd‘s (1997) work on collaboration and 
competition among firms in the early railroad industry. Dobbin and Dowd distinguish 
among three historical periods characterized by drastically different industry structures. 
Two of these periods are of specific interest for my argument. Between 1872 and 1896, 
policymakers encouraged railroads to collaborate in industry cartels. During this time, 
railroads from different regions of the US worked together to develop an integrated 
transportation system. In 1897, this period of collaboration ended as the U.S. Congress 
passed a new antitrust act. Competitive pressures increased in the railroad industry, and 
prior collaborative ties were broken up. This finding illustrates my point that the meaning 
of collaboration in young industries often is contested and renegotiated in various 
institutional arenas, in this case the U.S. Congress. 
Another illustration comes from Stark‘s (1996) work on the emergence of 
networks among firms in Hungary after the fall of socialism. He shows convincingly that 
firms without prior experience of a capitalist system developed market practices by 
building on the institutional arrangements that they had available during the socialist 
period. Stark writes: ―actors in the postsocialist context are rebuilding organizations and 
institutions not on the ruins but with the ruins of communism as they redeploy available 
resources in response to their immediate practical dilemmas‖ (p. 994) In other words, 
managers transposed their prior experiences from an established institutional context to 





spontaneous.  They occur without the central orchestration of policymakers that were 
highlighted by Dobbin and Dowd‘s historical study about the railroad industry. 
Nevertheless similar to Dobbin and Dowd, Stark emphasizes that inter-firm networks in 
novel contexts depend on institutional factors that influence how firms define and 
evaluate the appropriateness of their interactions with other organizations.  
Two theoretical implications follow from these insights. First, my focus on 
network formation in young industries does not reject the idea that firms‘ collaborative 
patterns depend on social constraints. I will argue that a range of institutional influences 
from professionals, public policy, established industries, and trade association shape 
collaborative patterns in a young industry. Thus firms in young industries tend to build on 
and extend practices that already exist in other social realms. For sociologists this 
argument means that research needs to focus on the range of ideas and resources that 
firms have available to understand the possible structures that can develop in a  young 
industry. Speaking to the literature on path dependencies in markets, I highlight that even 
the initial developments in a new field are deeply influenced by the contextual factors. 
Often those factors originated outside the boundaries of the emerging industry. But I will 
show in my empirical work that new institutions, such as new regulation and 
associations, also form over time. These institutions offer a context for firms‘ social and 
economic relationships.  
Second, from my theoretical framework follows a new level of analysis for 
examining how collaboration networks develop among firms. While most prior studies on 
network evolution have focused on processes inside organizations or between pairs of 





expect that institutional processes outside the firms‘ boundaries, and sometimes even 
outside the focal industry, influence why firms in some industries start to value 
collaboration with other organizations and engage in such practices. I expect that firms 
privilege ideas about collaboration to the extent that those ideas are rationalized and 
supported by various institutional arrangements. I will now provide an introduction to my 
empirical context before I offer a more detailed overview of my three empirical studies.  
Empirical Context: Networks in the Young Venture Capital Industry 
Empirically, my dissertation focuses on the formative years of the venture capital 
industry to understand how firms engage in collaboration in a new social field. Two 
forms of inter-organizational relations play a significant role in the contemporary venture 
capital industry. First, investors tend to form long-term relations with the entrepreneurs 
that they provide funding to. These relationships are often multiplex ties in the sense that 
financial resources are provided in combination with managerial and technical support 
(Gompers and Lerner 1999). Second, venture capital firms frequently pool resources into 
investment syndicates. Their shared involvement in deals has generated a web of 
collaborative relations among competing venture capital firms. This dual relational 
infrastructure has important financial and organizational ramifications. Entrepreneurs 
who receive funds from central venture capitalists are more likely to experience 
successful public stock offerings (Megginson and Weiss 1991; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels 
1999). Moreover, venture capitalists who work together in investment syndicates tend to 
have higher financial returns (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu 2007). This means that 





regions and nations (e.g. Kortum and Lerner 2000; Powell, Koput, Bowie, and Smith-
Doerr 2002). 
The first venture capital firms in the U.S. were established after the end of World 
War II (Reiner 1989), but it took several decades for the industry to mature. For example 
when American Research and Development (AR&D) was founded in 1946 as one of the 
first venture capital firms, Charles F Kettering, who was a leading inventor at that time, 
predicted that the firm would not survive more than five years (Ante 2008). The 
prediction proved to be incorrect. AR&D survived and became the first publically traded 
venture capital firm. But despite the financial success of individual venture capital firms, 
the nascent industry remained small for many years. In the early 1960s, the industry was 
still constituted by a set of loosely connected firms (Kogut, Urso, and Walker 2007) that 
frequently operated relatively independently of other investors.  
Against this background, the empirical analyses in my dissertation focus on the 
development of networks in the venture capital industry in the period between 1965 and 
1987. In this time, venture capital firms developed succinct practices for interacting with 
entrepreneurs on the one hand and other venture capital firms on the other hand. Venture 
capital firms increasingly used financial techniques to evaluate potential investment 
targets, and now each deal was seen as part of a broader investment portfolio. The 
development of these investment practices occurred during the 1970s and 1980s despite 
resistance from many early venture capitalists. For them more financially-oriented 
investment strategies symbolized a transition of venture capital from an entrepreneurial 
role to an investor role (Wilson 1985). Furthermore, in this time, interactions became 





resources into investment syndicates. Their shared work on deals generated ties among 
venture capital firms. In the mid-1980s, ninety-five percent of the firms in the industry 
were interconnected in one large network component (my estimate based on data from 
VentureXpert). 
Overview of the Three Papers 
In three inter-connected papers, my dissertation examines the emergence of 
institutional arrangements to govern inter-firm relations (Chapter 2), and how 
institutional mechanisms influences firms‘ decisions to collaborate (Chapter 3) and their 
selection of partners (Chapter 4).The empirical analyses draw on the case of venture 
capital to explain how the network structures of that field emerged during its early 
history. I will conclude this introduction chapter with a short summary of each empirical 
paper. 
In Chapter 2, I examine how people in an emerging industry draw on their 
emerging professional expertise to justify ideas regarding the institutional arrangements 
that govern inter-firm relations. I examine this question in a qualitative analysis of 
debates in the U.S. Congress from the 1960s to the mid-1980s about the policies that 
directed how private venture capital firms and federally supported Small Business 
Investment Companies (SBICs) financed small businesses. This comparative case study 
is an important example for understanding changes in institutions, since changes in public 
policy have been described as one important factor that enabled the growth in private 
venture capital and the decline of the SBIC industry in this period.  My analyses reveal 





criteria should financiers use to select target companies for their investments? Second, 
what financial instruments should be used to structure the interaction? Third, how much 
influence and control should the investor have over the entrepreneur? My results show 
that venture capitalists‘ success in defining answers to these questions depended on their 
ability to use professional expertise as a link between their personal motives and societal 
concerns such as job creation and economic growth. 
In Chapter 3, I examine how venture capitalists‘ prior career experiences 
influenced their decisions to form syndicates when investing in portfolio companies 
instead of investing alone. Firms in new and expanding industries are often forced to 
compete with companies in established industries for talented managers with proper skill 
sets (Sørensen 2004). One by product of the competition for managers is that firms in 
young industries often employ people with experiences from other industries that 
influence how they pursue business in the new industry. Drawing on this argument, I 
hypothesize that investment bankers and commercial bankers provided venture capital 
firms with two different models for how to finance small companies. Since investment 
bankers were used to syndicate deals, I expect that firms managed by investment bankers 
to have a higher propensity to collaborate on investments with other firms. Commercial 
bankers, in contrast, were used to a model of being a sole financier, and hence I expect 
firms managed by such people to be less likely to collaborate on investments. I use a 
dataset of venture capital firms and their managers‘ career experiences to test these 
hypotheses. I find no support for the idea that investment bankers increased the likelihood 






Finally, I investigate in Chapter 4 how venture capital firms‘ shared participation 
in field-wide institutions, in my case trade associations, influenced their likelihood to 
collaborate with each other. In this paper, I shift the focus from organizational level 
decisions to dyadic partner choice between pairs of venture capital firms to understand 
how network patterns evolve over time. I theorize that trade associations exert two forms 
of institutional pressures that influence the likelihood that firms form co-investment 
relations with each other. On the one hand, trade associations integrate firms in an 
industry. Trade associations are arenas where firms learn about potential collaborators, 
coordinate technological decisions and standards, and develop shared understandings and 
identities (Rosenkopf, Metiu, and George 2001; Saxenian 1994). For these reasons, firms 
involved in the same trade association are more likely to forge collaborative relations 
with each other. On the other hand, activities in trade associations depend also on firms‘ 
uniqueness. Since associations are structured around sub-communities of firms with 
similar characteristics and interests, they emphasize and reinforce existing distinctions in 
the field. Therefore, I expect that the effect of shared membership in trade association on 
collaboration is weaker for firms that are different in terms of geographic focus, target 
clients, and status. I use my dataset on venture capital firms and information about shared 
membership in trade associations to predict which pairs of venture capitalists were likely 
to work together on investments. I find that the positive effect of shared membership in 
trade associations on collaboration is strongly mitigated by firm differences. This finding 
has important implications for understanding why networks tend to be structured around 





Taken together, the three papers offer a window for understanding how 
institutions influence networks of inter-firm relations in a young industry. They highlight 
how different aspects of the institutional landscape – public policy, professional 
expertise, established industries, and trade associations – can shape firms‘ interactions 
with other organizations. A thread unifying the three chapters is that institutional 
arrangements in young industries often are fragmented and expose firms to a set of 
tensions. Broadly stated, to explain the trajectory of an industry, we need to understand 
contingencies arising from competing institutional pressures and how individuals and 
firms resolve institutional tensions. I will develop this perspective on network formation 





CHAPTER 2: HOW INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS EMBEDD 





The paper examines the use of professional claims during policy-making 
processes as a means to influence the pattern of relations that exists among firms in a 
market. While prior studies in organization theory have highlighted that firms‘ relations 
with other organizations reflect institutional arrangements, less is known about the 
processes that shape those institutions. A qualitative analysis of hearings about small 
business financing in the U.S. Congress between mid-1960s and mid-1980s demonstrates 
that participants in policy-making processes used appeals to professional expertise to 
rationalize the meaning of financiers‘ relations with entrepreneurs and resolve tensions 
between private interests and societal concerns. Understanding how individuals and 
organizations reconcile conflicting meaning systems and embedd market relations in 
society is crucial for explaining why networks among organizations develop into stable, 
self-reproducing structures. 
                                                 
1 I thank Lauren Brady for excellent research assistance and participants in the Economic Sociology 






Firms in industries with dispersed knowledge and resources often depend on 
ongoing relations with other organizations for their survival (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; 
Uzzi 1996). These relationships of social and economic exchange are embedded in other 
institutional arrangements. While the present paper mainly is concerned with public 
policy, I will use the term institution to refer to regulations, norms, and cognitive frames 
that are shared and taken-for-granted by participants in a social field (Jepperson 1991; 
Scott 2008). Institutional differences are often pointed to as reasons for why networks of 
inter-firm relations vary between regions (Hamilton and Biggart 1988; Owen-Smith and 
Powell 2004) and over time (Powell, White, Koput, and Owen-Smith 2005; Stark 1996). 
In short, institutions influence how firms form relationships with other organizations 
(Grabher and Stark 1997; Owen-Smith and Powell 2004; Powell, White, Koput, and 
Owen-Smith 2005), and how firms extract benefits from their networks (Ingram and 
Lifschitz 2006; Mizruchi, Stearns, and Marquis 2006). 
The institutional perspective has in recent years gained recognition in research on 
inter-firm networks. Also practitioners and regulators have shown interest in 
understanding the institutional context of firms‘ interactions, since economic activities 
span organizational boundaries in many important industries including finance, 
biotechnology, and semiconductors. Nevertheless, with a few notable exceptions (Dobbin 
and Dowd 1997; Dobbin and Dowd 2000; Fligstein 2001), the literature is largely 
missing an account for the processes that generate the institutional landscape that governs 





large body of work in sociology (DiMaggio 1988; Fligstein 1990), economics (North 
1990), and political science (Streeck and Thelen 2005; Thelen 2004) that the institutions 
that govern organizational practices do change over time leading to drastic 
transformations of the business environments. In this paper, I focus on the making of 
public policy to shed light on the processes in which business leaders, regulators, and 
representatives from other interest groups negotiate different understandings for how to 
regulate firms‘ interactions with their counterparts. I will also explain how people were 
able to resolve tensions between different interest groups, thereby influencing the 
outcome of institutional processes. 
The development of public policy offers an illustrative example for understanding 
the different strategies that participants in a field can use to justify ideas about the 
institutional structures that govern inter-firm relationships. The creation of public policy 
is often associated with formalization, that is the generation of state sanctioned 
institutional scripts that specify how firms are expected to act under different 
contingencies. I extend this view on institutional creation by showing the importance of 
justifications grounded in professional expertise as means to rationalize and change the 
policies that regulate inter-firm relationships. I will propose that such justifications can 
counteract tendencies towards increased formalization. Since professionals‘ long-term 
reputation is grounded in disinterestedness, they can resolve conflicts between firms‘ 
private interests and broader societal concerns. For these reasons, firms can use 
arguments grounded in a professional expertise to generate policies that entitle them to 





By stressing the role of arguments based in professional expertise during policy 
processes, my work extends the literature on networks and institutions in two important 
directions. First, I contribute to theory by explaining the emergence of the institutional 
arrangements that govern inter-firm relations. As a complement to prior work on how 
political truces generate institutions that stabilize interactions among firms (Fligstein 
1996; Fligstein 2001), my work highlights that the institutional landscape of a market 
also can be characterized by ambiguities and change. Especially, I expect this to be the 
case in emerging and dynamic fields where institutions often are in conflict with each 
other or perceived as ill-suited, since they are inherited from other social contexts. 
Ambiguities and uncertainties force different stakeholder groups to make sense of 
institutional arrangement and attribute meaning to them (Czarniawska and Sevón 1996; 
Edelman 1992; Goodrick and Salancik 1996). I propose that the reconciliation of 
institutional tensions is a necessary condition that needs to be met before firms‘ networks 
develop into stable, self-reproducing structures. 
Second, my work contributes to the literature on networks and institutions by 
highlighting how tensions between interest groups can be resolved with arguments based 
in professional expertise. While prior studies have shown that assertion based on 
professional expertise can legitimize practices that are internal to organizations 
(DiMaggio 1991; Hwang and Powell 2009), I believe that such assertions play an even 
more significant role when we consider the practices that firms use in their interactions 
with other firms. A firm‘s relationship with another firm is often of interest for other 
market participants and in some cases the society at large. For example, I will show in my 





such as job creation, new technologies, and other positive or negative outcomes. When 
the effects of dyadic relations spill over to third parties, firms‘ relations with each other 
tend to become a concern for policy-makers. Arguments based on professional expertise 
are often highly influential in contexts where groups hold different interests. Such 
arguments have the capacity to embed firms‘ dyadic relations in society, and thereby 
bridging tensions between private interests and societal concerns. These tensions are 
inherent to many policy-making processes, since policy-makers need to listen to and 
satisfy multiple interest groups to stay in power (Hansen 1991). 
In the following sections, I develop my account for how professional claims can 
be used to shape the institutions that govern interactions between firms. I do so in the 
context of an empirical analysis of debates in the U.S. Congress between 1965-1985 
about relations between financial firms and small businesses. My empirical focus is on 
private venture capital firms and small business investment companies (SBICs) which are 
two forms of organizations that offer capital to small businesses. The two cases are 
valuable for institutional analyses, since changes in public policy often are seen as one 
key explanation for the growth of private capital firms and the decline of the SBIC 
industry from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. Furthermore regulatory changes 
associated the two forms of organizations with different types of small business 
investments. Differences can be discerned along three relational dimensions: First, which 
small businesses should receive capital; second, which financial instruments should be 
used; and third, how much power should financial firms have over entrepreneurs. For 





translate into three questions about partner selection, the content of network ties, and 
social influence.  
During the 1970s and early 1980s, private venture capital firms were successful in 
influencing several aspects of their regulatory environment. They advocated for cuts in 
capital gain taxes, changes of the ERISA legislation which had reduced pension funds‘ 
investments in venture capital, and better conditions for liquidating investments in small 
businesses. These institutional changes made it easier for private venture capital firms not 
only to raise funds, but also to select investment targets in capital intensive industries, 
making deals based on equity, and take control positions and influence the governance of 
the companies that they financed. I find that private venture capital firms were making 
arguments about institutional arrangements by emphasizing their professional expertise in 
the area of small business investments. They were able to amend formalized regulatory 
scripts to their favor by showing how their private interests aligned with the concerns of 
other interests groups, for example concerns about job creation and technological 
innovation. 
SBICs, in contrast, were highly criticized during this period for being 
mismanaged, for showing negative financial returns, and even for committing legal 
violations. Firms in the SBIC industry struggled with resolving tensions between their 
private interests and the goals of the government that supported the SBIC industry by 
allowing SBICs to leverage their private capital with federal funds. Amended regulations 
made it increasingly attractive to focus on investments in a broad set of industries and 
especially in companies with owners from minority groups. The SBIC industry was also 





over the companies that they financed. SBICs learned over time to work with this 
legislation instead of arguing for more flexible regulations that would give their more 
autonomy in the interactions with entrepreneurs. Thus SBICs came to operate in a 
different institutional environment than private venture capital firms. 
How Institutional Mechanisms Embedd Relations between Firms 
Long ago, Weber (1922/1978) described legal institutions as important 
components of capitalist societies. The rise of bureaucratic, and rule-bound, organizations 
was certainly one important observation behind Weber‘s interest in formally governed 
action, but his writings about economic theory also suggest that formal rules are 
important elements of markets, and by extension a part of the environment in which firms 
interact with each other. Weber described how regulation restricts the freedom of market 
competition by setting limitations on who can be involved in exchange and what objects 
that can be exchanged (Weber 1922/1978, p 82-83). In doing so, he paved the way for a 
large number of studies in organizational theory and economic sociology on how public 
policy influences firms‘ strategies, including firms‘ decisions for how to interact with 
other organizations in the market (Dobbin and Dowd 2000; Fligstein 2001).  
The impact of public policy on network structures is for example illuminated by 
the varieties of capitalism tradition which distinguishes between different forms of 
institutional contexts, each associated with a distinct pattern cooperation and competition 
between firms (Hall and Soskice 2001). Firms in liberal market economies such as the 
United States and Britain tend to organize their interactions as arm‘s-length exchanges, 





countries rely more extensively on strategic relationships. Research on transition 
economies such as China, Hungary and the Czech Republic further suggests that that the 
move from socialist towards capitalist institutions changed the nature of industrial 
networks (Grabher and Stark 1997; Keister 2001; McDermott 2002; Stark 1996). The 
impact of public policy on inter-firm relations has also been documented at the level of 
individual industries. Historical analyses of the railroad industry (Dobbin 1994; Dobbin 
and Dowd 2000) and radio broadcasting (Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, and King 1991) 
have nicely demonstrated that the regulations define what forms of relations are accepted 
and desired in a market. As new definitions of how organizations should relate 
themselves to other market participants became instantiated in policy and legal 
institutions, organizations changed the modes of interactions. 
As suggested in the introduction, public policy is often viewed as institutional 
scripts that gain authority from being supported and enforced by the state and the legal 
system. These scripts are abstractions that outline how firms are expected to act under 
different circumstances (Stinchcombe 2001). When organizational researchers talk about 
the development of regulatory institutions, they often refer to the process in which 
interpretations regarding policy and law are worked out and details become scripted into 
the books (Edelman, Uggen, and Erlanger 1999). I expect, however, that the development 
of institutions for the governance of inter-firm relations also may based on arguments 
grounded in professional expertise. Unlike formalization which standardizes the rules for 
economic activity, professionalization is an expertise-based approach to economic 





generating rules that are more flexible and allow firms to act under greater levels of 
discretion. 
 There are many reasons to pay attention to arguments grounded in professional 
expertise during processes of institutional emergence and change. First, from the 
sociological literature, we know that new groups who want to become professions need to 
participate in policy processes to achieve that objective (Freidson 1986). Professions 
emerge when a group stakes out a task domain and gain institutional recognition as 
experts in that domain (Abbott 1988). For example, Abbott‘s work shows that groups that 
today are taken-for-granted as professions including law and medicine, had to engage in 
politics to achieve self-governance and recognition as experts. Since professions depend 
on institutional processes for their status and autonomy, I expect that arguments based on 
professional expertise are ubiquitous in any policy-process where groups with 
professional aspirations are involved. 
 Second, research in the fields of organization theory and economic sociology 
highlights that arguments grounded in a professional expertise often are convincing 
justifications for how economic activities should be organized. Berger and Luckmann 
(1967), whose work has been highly influential on modern institutional thought, 
recognized that experts provide the members of a society with world views that facilitate 
coordination and interaction. The power of these world views stems from their causal 
theories that explain why a social order should exhibits certain properties. While Berger 
and Luckmann did not explicitly discuss the sources of expertise, later work in the 
institutional tradition has associated expertise power with professional groups (see e.g. 





 Following these early theoretical statements, contemporary organizational 
research describes professional expertise as crucial for both institutional maintenance and 
change. For example, Greenwood et al. (2002) found that professions are important 
agents of change since they tend to link organizational failures to potential solutions. 
According to this study, and many other in the institutional tradition of organization 
theory, assertions based on professional expertise changes organizations by transforming 
the normative aspects of the organizations‘ institutional environments. Research building 
on Callon‘s (1998) concept of performativity has also noted the power of arguments 
grounded in professional expertise. Studies in this area have shown how groups that 
claim professional status and authority, especially economists, legitimatize the use of new 
technologies and methods for economic transactions (MacKenzie and Millo 2003).  
 I expect that the power to rationalize, justify, and normalize ideas about economic 
activity makes arguments based on professional expertise influential during policy 
processes. I believe that these effects occur via two complementary paths. Most prior 
research has emphasized that arguments grounded in professional expertise changes 
organizations via normative mechanisms. Organizational theorists often describe 
professionals as carriers of practices and ideas in markets (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
Professionals advise, consult, and standardize of market activities and they force thereby 
organizations to adopt specific practices and structures (DiMaggio 1991; DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983; Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings 2002). My work will propose a second 
complementary causal path. I will emphasize that arguments grounded in professional 
expertise can change regulatory institutions which subsequently exerts coercive pressures 





 My analysis builds on these insights about institutional change and professional 
claims to contribute to knowledge about the evolution of inter-organizational relations. I 
focus on the use of arguments grounded in professional expertise as a means to influence 
public policy. Policy processes shape beliefs about how inter-organizational relations 
should be structured. Such processes are often surrounded by contestations and 
negotiations since the value of relations with other firms is contingent on a range of 
factors that are difficult to foresee and thus difficult to assess a priori (Gulati and Higgins 
2003; Mizruchi, Stearns, and Marquis 2006). I will further suggest that participants in 
policy process can use different forms of arguments for making claims about the structure 
of inter-organizational relations. Policy developments can be associated with 
formalization. Formalization generates state sanctioned rules that standardize the way 
that relations between organizations are structured. Policy processes can also be driven 
by professionalization. Professionalization represents claims that are based on expertise 
credentials and the process decentralizes influence and control. My argument proposes 
that the different principles of formalization and professionalization generate different 
institutional landscapes, and the use of these arguments is therefore consequential for the 
structure of inter-organizational relations that exist in a market. In the following 
empirical analysis, I disentangle the processes that shape the institutional context of 





Empirical Context: Private Venture Capital Firms’ and SBICs’ Financing 
Relations with Small Businesses 
Small businesses‘ access to external capital is a long standing concern for 
entrepreneurs and policy-makers alike. Commercial banks, one source of capital for small 
businesses, have throughout history been criticized for being too restrictive when 
evaluating new businesses‘ prospects. After the Great Depression in the 1930s, banks 
enforced more conservative lending policies which made it increasingly challenging for 
smaller firms to receive long term loans with good terms and increased their dependence 
on private funding sources (Reiner 1989). Against this backdrop, two related industries 
dedicated to small business financing were created in the 1940s and 1950s. The first 
private venture capital firms were founded in 1946. These firms operated as financial 
intermediaries between private investors and small companies. The first Small Business 
Investment Companies (SBICs) were established after the passing of the Small Business 
Investment Act in 1958. These firms were also financial intermediaries focused on 
entrepreneurship, but they could in contrast to private venture capital firms leverage their 
private capital with federal funds. 
Private venture capital firms and SBICs were born into an ambiguous and 
uncertain institutional context. Many of the regulations that governed capital markets in 
that time were set in place during the 1930s and early 1940s, including the major U.S. 
banking acts and securities acts. These regulations were established with large financial 
institutions in mind especially investment banks and commercial banks, and they 





financial activities from each other. Moreover the existing financial regulation focused 
mainly on stock offerings and equity investments in larger corporations. These 
regulations were often perceived as inappropriate and too constraining for financial firms 
focused on investments in small entrepreneurial companies, since the financing of such 
businesses differs from that of large companies in terms of risk taking and size. Aside 
from the challenges stemming from inherited rules, general changes in the U.S financial 
markets made regulatory concerns salient for venture capital firms and SBICs in the 
period between 1965 and 1985. After a decade of booming stock markets, the economy 
began to slow down by the end of 1969. The following years was characterized by 
declining optimism among investors in public capital markets and rising unemployment 
rates. The market conditions worsened with the oil crises that started to build up in 1973 
and to the list of economic challenges, high inflation rates were now added. The economy 
did not improve again until the beginning of the 1980s. During these years of crises, 
policy-makers considered a large range of measure for improving companies‘ and private 
peoples‘ access to capital. Among other things, credit markets were deregulated which 
made it easier for people to access fund but increased the cost of financing (Krippner 
Forthcoming).   
In this period of institutional uncertainty, private venture capital firms and SBICs 
experimented with a range of new methods to fund entrepreneurial enterprises. Private 
venture capital firms and SBICs distinguished themselves from commercial banks which 
they saw as too focused on transactional short-term loans, and investment banks which 
they saw as too focused on the concerns of large corporations. In contrast, the financing 





financial commitments both from the side of the financier and the small business. Shares 
in small and privately held companies are by definition not traded in stock markets and 
highly illiquid. Therefore, compared to commercial banks whose interactions with small 
businesses predominately were of an arm‘s-length and transactional nature, private 
venture capitalists and SBICs established closer relations with the companies that the 
funded typically for five years or more. Financing developed in this setting into a 
relational endeavor in which capital providers and entrepreneurs not just transacted, but 
also interacted and built close and long-term relations with one another. These 
relationships typically involved technical and managerial support along with financing 
(see for example Shane and Cable 2002). 
Many elements in these new financing models were however difficult to align 
with existing regulatory arrangements and ongoing legislative processes. For example, 
regulators were seeking to constrain the rules of initial public offerings after the 
economic down turn starting in the late 1960s; yet the proposed changes were opposed by 
small business investors since they reduced their ability to have larger equity stakes in a 
company (Reiner 1989). Another example from the mid-1970s are a series of complains 
in the U.S. Congress from venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, and industry associations in 
the U.S. Congress about the rise in capital gain taxes after 1969. This tax legislation, they 
argued, assumed that financiers generate returns from dividends. They continued by 
pointing to evidence that small businesses, in contrast to large corporations, cannot afford 
to pay dividends. They claimed: ―Since high-growth companies can‘t generate enough 
retained earnings to finance their growth, they need constant injection of private capital. 





1980a, p 13) This case is one of many examples where financial firms and entrepreneurs 
testified in front of Congress about the need for new institutional arrangements, in this 
case a new tax legislation, that would better support financial mechanisms targeted 
towards the small business community. 
The particularities in financing activities developed by private venture capital 
firms and SBICs generated much attention from policy-makers and other interest groups 
during the early years of the two industries. Small businesses‘ need for financing was not 
a debated issue: The cold war, high unemployment rates, and slow economic growth 
made entrepreneurship and the development of new technologies prioritized political 
agenda items (Reiner 1989). Small businessmen testified repeatedly in Congress about 
the scarcity of capital and how undercapitalization restricted their growth. For example,  
Mr. Zschau from the American Electronics Association and an inventor of a technology 
for ink jet imagining described:  ―The capital was not available in the United States. We 
were repeatedly told that people were interested, but it was too risky‖ (Congress 1980a, p 
44). Instead of discussing the need for more risk capital, congressmen and various 
interest groups debated the different organizational and relational means that venture 
capitalists and SBICs engaged in to reach that end, and how to best design institutions 
that would support desired outcomes (see e.g. Congress 1966b, p 1). Finding appropriate 
institutional arrangements was often described as difficult task. People from all involved 
interest groups – policy-makers, financial firms, small businesses, and others --  referred 
to many changes: the exceptionally high risk in the field of small business financing, the 
tendencies for financiers to achieve low returns, and the high rates of bankruptcy among 





problems arising from the different interests of investors, small businesses, and the 
government. 
During the period from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, policy processes in the 
U.S. Congress generated several changes to the regulatory landscape that governed the 
financing activities of private venture capital firms and SBICs. As briefly outlined in the 
introduction of this paper, private venture capital firms developed into a set of 
organizations focused on capital intensive industries especially high technology sectors. 
Private venture capital firms invested in companies using equity instruments and they 
often took equity positions that allowed them to influence the governance of the 
company. Compare this model to the once that came to dominate the SBIC industry. 
SBICs focused a broader set of industries, they often used debt instruments instead of 
equity, and regulators restricted in their ability to take control positions in the companies 
that they financed.  
Associated with these changes in institutional arrangements were differences in 
the growth of the two industries. Figure 2.1 graphs the annual number of new financing 
deals that private venture capitalists and SBICs closed with small businesses between 
1960 and 1985. Consider first the line marked by triangles which represents financing 
deals closed by private venture capitalist. During the late 1970s, the number of new 
financing ties that were formed between private venture capitalists and small businesses 
increased. Private venture capitalists gained during this period recognition from policy-
makers and they were able to shape formal institutions to their favor. Then turn to the line 
marked by circles which represents financing deals closed by SBICs. Note in particular 





period, new regulations were enforced that restricted SBICs‘ investment practices. In the 
1970s and the 1980s the annual number of financing events in the SBIC industry 
remained relatively constant. During this time, legislators and SBIC investors negotiated 
finer details regarding SBICs‘ financing activities. These changes ensure that the industry 
survived despite being criticized by many politicians, but they limited the industry‘s 
growth. My empirical analysis examines how these institutional changes came about by 
focusing on the arguments that were made by different interest groups in the U.S 
Congress and how those arguments spoke to tensions between firms‘ private interests and 






Figure 2.1 Formation of New Financing Relations for SBICs and Private Venture Capital Firms, 
1960-1985. Sources: Data for venture capital relations was retrieved from the VentureXpert 
database. Data for SBIC relations was compiled by the author from SBA statistics presented in 
congressional hearings (Congress 1963; Congress 1964; Congress 1978b; Congress 1987). 
 
Data and Method 
The results reported in this paper are based on a historical study of how venture 
capitalists‘ and SBICs‘ financing relations with small businesses were debated during 
hearings in the U.S. Congress from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s. In line with prior 
studies in political science and sociology, I view Congressional hearings as an important 
data source for understanding how policy makers and interest groups negotiate 





Congress represent attempts to interpret the past, define the present, and influence the 
future structures of a market, and they reveal a range of tactics and strategies pursued by 
individuals and organizations with different interests and agendas (Owen-Smith and 
Craciun 2008). I started my study by identifying all transcripts from Congressional 
hearings in the period 1965-1985 (from the 89
th
 to the first session of the 99
th
 Congress) 
in which the main concern was capital formation and the financing of small businesses. I 
searched in the Lexis Nexis Congressional Universe database for term ―small business‖ 
combined with different derivation of the term financing (e.g. finance, financial) or the 
term capital. A second coder and I read independently the chair persons‘ opening 
statements of these hearings to identify which of these hearings that clearly focused on 
interactions between financiers and small businesses
2
.  
The final dataset consists of twenty-six hearings. SBICs‘ financing relations with 
small businesses were a central concern, as defined by the chair persons‘ opening 
statement, in twenty-two hearings spread throughout the period of interest (mid-1960s to 
mid-1980s). Based on the same criterion, venture capital firms‘ relations with small 
businesses were a central concern in eleven hearings mainly held during the second half 
of the 1970s and the early 1980s. Appendix 1 presents an overview of the hearings 
analyzed in this study including the title, the organizing congressional committee, the 
dates, and the chair person who lead the hearing. As expected based on the division of 
labor in Congress, most hearings in my analysis were held in the Committees on Small 
                                                 
2 In a robustness test, in which we coded the whole transcript for a sample of hearings, we found that the 






Business in the Senate and the House respectively, and the two committees‘ 
subcommittees.  
Next I relied on a qualitative content analysis to develop insights into participants‘ 
efforts to shape the institutions that govern inter-organizational relations. Each hearing 
contains statements by policy-makers and a set of testimonies by representatives of 
different interest groups. My study builds on a method that focuses on understanding 
variation in the claims made by different participants in policy processes, as compared to 
methods that center on the modal trends in individuals‘ belief systems and opinions. I 
chose this strategy since my goal is to develop theory instead of testing causal 
relationships. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the different interest groups that were 
represented in the hearings and a count of how many testimonies that were made on 
behalf of each interest group. In total my analysis covers 325 testimonies. 94 testimonies 
(28.9%) were made on behalf of small businesses, 18 testimonies (5.5%) were made on 
behalf of venture capital firms, and 77 testimonies (23.7%) were made on behalf of 
SBICs. Other interests that were frequently represented include government agencies and 
departments in particular the Small Business Administration, other financial institutions 






Table 2.1 Number of Testimonies by Interest Group 
 
 
I analyzed the testimonies in three iterations. First, I used an open-ended coding 
scheme to identify the different forms of claims that were made regarding private venture 
capital firms‘ and SBICs‘ financing relations with small businesses. From the first 
iteration of data coding, the important role of formalization and professional expertise 
became evident. Returning to the institutional literature on institutional change, I refined 
my coding scheme to reflect prior theoretical insights. I continued thereafter the content 
analysis in a second iteration to unpack how different forms of claims were used by 
participants in Congressional hearings to influence the institutions that govern firms‘ 
interactions with each other. This part of my analysis centered in particular on text 
segments where formalization and professionalization were discussed simultaneously. 
Tensions between different arguments and counter arguments where here viewed as a 
window into understanding the political struggles that drive network change. I found in 
this stage that the formalization and professionalization often counteract each other 





iteration of my content analysis which focused on how participants resolved differences 
in interests and opinions regarding institutional arrangements. By tracing contested 
aspects regarding venture capitalists‘ and SBIC‘s financing relations with small 
businesses across time, I was able to understand how organizations reconciled different 
ideas for how to develop policies and regulate the financing activities of private venture 
capital firms and SBICs. In the following two sections, I will outline how participants in 
these policy processes used arguments based on formal scripts and professional expertise 
to justify ideas regarding the institutions that govern the financing activities of private 
venture capital firms and SBICs. 
Results 
Formal Scripts and Professional Expertise in the Private Venture Capital Industry 
Discussion about private venture capitalists‘ roles in small business financing 
took off in the U.S. Congress in the mid-1970s. Private venture capital firms struggled, 
similar to many other companies, to find business opportunities when the economy 
stagnated during the 1970s. Venture capitalists were concerned about legislative changes 
for initial public stock offerings (IPOs), since IPOs is one of the major sources for 
venture capital firms to liquidate their investments and generate financial returns. The 
industry was negatively affected by the Employment Retirement Security Act (ERISA) 
which was passed by Congress in 1974. Venture capitalists‘ position as financial 
intermediaries was undermined by a collective interpretation in the financial community 





capitalists‘ risky financing commitments to small businesses (see e.g. Congress 1980b). 
As pension funds and other institutional investors stopped making investments in venture 
capital funds, the capital that venture capital fund had available for investments in small 
businesses declined shapely. Venture capitalists were also concerned about capital gain 
taxes, which they described as factor that limited their ability to pursue investments in 
high growth companies (Congress 1980a).  
In this period, private venture capitalists started to ask legislators for new 
regulation that would better suited their investment activities. Policy-makers were 
confronted with decisions about which types of investment activities that best would 
support entrepreneurial enterprises and how to design an institutional context that would 
be beneficial not only for private venture capital firms but also other interest groups 
including the smalll business community and the American society at large. In many 
hearings during the 1970s and early 1980s, venture capital firms openly criticized the 
regulations that governed their investments in small businesses. For example, Mr. 
Hagopian, General Partner of a Californian venture capital firm reflected on the 
developments of the venture capital market by saying: ―Venture capital has historically 
had to break its way through government regulation in order to get to the young 
technology companies who are able to provide the major impetus to innovation in this 
country‖ (Congress 1982, p 47). To solve this situation he advocated for increased 
communication between the government and professionals as a means to build an 
institutional climate that can foster entrepreneurship. He continued: ―alternatively, we 
will just be coming to you every year telling you about this regulation or that regulation, 





means alone in making the argument that the formal institutions of capital markets had 
hurt the venture capital industry. Similar calls for more flexible institutional arrangements 
better suited for equity investments in small businesses were presented by venture 
capitalists as well as small businessmen in several different hearings during the examined 
time period (e.g. Congress 1977; Congress 1980c). The debates about the institutional 
context for private venture capital firms can be analyzed along three dimensions: 
selection of investment targets, choice of financial instruments, and influence over the 
company that receives funding.  
First, consider discussions in Congress about the targets that private venture 
capitalists invested in. This aspect was central to many discussions about how to regulate 
the venture capital industry, since private venture capital investors often pointed to their 
expertise in selecting out and supporting companies with strong growth potential. By 
supporting such companies, venture capitalists generated not only financial returns for 
their own firms. They contributed also to society by helping promising companies to 
expand their business. Such claims about expertise were frequently used by venture 
capitalists to justify their ability to structure their interactions with entrepreneurs in a 
responsible and effective way. Yet, much time was spent in Congress to discuss what 
level of risk that investors should take when selecting which companies to finance. The 
passing of ERISA in 1974 made concerns about risk salient. The prudent man rule of 
ERISA made venture capital firms concerned about making investments in companies 
with innovative but uncertain technologies, since such investments would reduce their 





experienced problems with raising venture capital during the 1970s despite investors‘ 
interest in their technologies.  
Mr. Alan Greenspan, at the time chairman and president of an economic 
consulting firm, commented in Congress on the importance of regulations that allow 
venture capital firms to invest in companies with high risk.  He argued that risk should be 
weighted against the potential benefits when designing institutions that governing small 
business investments. He testified in front of Congress: ―… if you happen to make a 
terribly imprudent investment of investing in a company when it is very small, you are 
subject to grave criticism. That results from the failure to recognize that while the very 
nature of small business in more risky, it has far greater potential for growth and 
innovation in many respects than larger businesses, so that much of what is in, for 
example, the ERISA amendments and the like, I think are very helpful.‖ (Congress 
1980a, p 101).  Venture capitalists also argued for institutions that would allow them to 
make investments in high technology industries despite the risk associated with new 
technologies. In several hearings, venture capitalists described for policy-makers the 
careful process in which investors evaluated new deals. This line of argumentation is 
evident in a testimony by Mr. Golder, President of the National Venture Capital 
Association. He argues that ―a venture firm itself is a professionally managed corporation 
or limited partnership which has invested capital of $5-50 million or more. It undertakes 
intensive analyses of each prospective investment, structures each investment 
individually to protect its position (and thereby the position of investors in the firm), and 





It is important to note that venture capital investors claimed to be professionals 
despite the absence of formal education or authorization, which usually are seen as 
important markers of a profession.  Private venture capitalists‘ arguments for more 
flexibility in choosing investment targets emphasized their knowledge about the small 
business community and their ability to evaluate prospects. They emphasized that they 
reduced risk by developing close relations with the companies that they financed and 
supporting them through the entrepreneurial process. Mr Golder provided more details 
about the various practices that venture capitalists use to ensure the success of the 
companies that they invest in. He continue then ―Of course, the venture capitalist 
continues to be an integral part of the business after the investment is made. In fact, the 
typical professional staff of venture capital firms supervise only 3 to 7 portfolio 
companies per person‖ (Congress 1980b, p 1260). Professional ideals were in this sense 
used as a counter argument to reduce regulatory pressures in the venture capital industry 
and to allow firms to invest in targets in risky high technology industries. 
 Second, debates also focused on the financial instruments that private venture 
capitalists used to fund small businesses. While equity was the preferred instrument 
among private venture capitalists, venture capitalists raised concerns about the 
institutional arrangements that regulated such investments. As already described, they 
found capital gain taxes to high for allowing venture capital firms to generate any returns 
from equity investments. Private venture capitalists lobbied successfully for a series of 
cuts in capital gain taxes in the late 1970s and early 1980s. They were also partially 





companies that they invested in started the process of offering stock in public markets 
(see e.g. Congress 1980a).  
 A third dimension concerns private venture capitalists‘ influence over the 
companies that received funds. I will show in my next section that legislators were very 
concerned about SBICs‘ ability to influence small businesses and they created institutions 
that would secure entrepreneurs‘ autonomy. Private venture capitalists, in contrast, were 
able to link their professional expertise to their participation in governance matters. They 
argued that their active support made them responsible investors, which in turn would be 
good for the growth of the company and the economy as a whole. For example in a 
hearing on a bill to amend the Securities Act of 1933 and the Investment Company Act of 
1940 (Congress 1978a), representatives from the venture capital industry explain for 
policy-makers how firms in their industry differed from other types of investment 
companies. Mr. Heizer, director or the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA), 
listed a large number of important difference including the type of interactions that 
venture capitalists typically developed with their portfolio companies. Venture capital 
firms, he argued, participate more actively in the portfolio companies that other 
investment companies; they take control positions and they have board seats. Formal 
institutions were here described an obstacle that limited venture capital investors‘ 
discretion and flexibility to design efficient financing contracts that take into account the 






Formal Scripts and Professional Expertise in the SBIC Industry 
The SBIC industry offers an interesting comparative example to the private 
venture capital industry. Since SBICs had access to federal funds, policy-makers have 
always paid much attention to the regulation of these firms. The SBIC industry was from 
the outset a highly political project, and the industry‘s existence depended on support 
from policy-makers. During World War II, politicians began to express concerns over 
small businesses‘ special difficulties, including these firms‘ limited access to financing.  
After some years of temporary support to small businesses from the Smaller War Plants 
Corporation (SWPC), the Small Defense Plants Administration (SDPA) and the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC), Representative Hill (R-CO) and Senator 
Thye (R-MI) started in 1953 the work of forming a new permanent federal agency, the 
Small Business Administration (SBA) (Congress 1953). SBA‘s early support to small 
businesses was, however, criticized by interests in the financial community as well as 
small businesses for being too focused on lending instead of equity. The long term 
commitment of equity investments was viewed as a preferred form of financing that 
would bring continuity for the entrepreneurial firm. Another benefit from equity is that it 
often can be used to rise additional funding via credit. The provision of equity financing 
was the official impetus behind the creation of the SBIC industry. The SBIC industry 
straddled the land of government support and private financing. The industry consisted of 
privately held firms that were licensed by the SBA. Further SBA supported the new 
industry by allowing SBICs to leverage their private capital from stockholders with loans 





Yet akin to private venture capital firms, SBICs were initially struggling to make 
sense of the new market niche and its institutional arrangements. By the middle of the 
1960s, many SBICs were in serious financial trouble as a result of unsuccessful 
investments and lending activities. Some SBICs were even accused for criminal 
violations and involved in law suits due to illegal financial transactions. Congressmen 
from both sides of the aisle were worried about these problems and the fact that a 
federally supported industry suffered from economic losses (e.g. Congress 1966a; 
Congress 1967). Representative Evins (D-TN) declared in the opening statement of a 
hearing in July of 1966 that the ―[SBIC] program is falling far short of congressional 
hopes and objectives‖ (Congress 1966b). In another hearing held later the same year, the 
SBIC industry continued to be highly criticized. The recently appointed the SBA 
administrator Mr. Boutin was asked by Senator Harris (D-OK) to account for his efforts 
to improve the SBIC industry. Mr. Boutin testified that SBA had scaled up their 
investigation of the industry and classified 267 out of 708 licensed SBICs as ―problem 
cases‖. Many people testifying during this hearing asked for more SBA interventions in 
the SBIC industry. For example Mr. Walsh, an investigator on the staff of the Senate 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, criticized SBA for lax oversight of SBICs 
and proposed that regulators needed to act more forcefully in companies that display 
problems to reduce losses (Congress 1966a). 
In this situation of financial challenges, economic uncertainties, and even criminal 
violations, policy-makers and various stakeholder groups engaged in efforts to change the 
institutional context of the SBIC industry. Participants in these institutional processes 





importantly, however, they emphasized the need for more elaborated regulations 
sanctioned by SBA. Similar to private venture capital firms, SBICs‘ activities were 
embedded in the general legal framework of capital markets. In addition, SBICs were 
regulated under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958. The Small Business 
Investment Act specified how SBIC‘s should operate and what tools and practices that 
they should use to finance small businesses. The Act further identified limitations 
regarding net worth, total assets, and net income for the companies that SBICs could fund 
(Noone and Rubel 1970). As problems in the SBIC industry were uncovered in the mid-
1960s, Congressmen expressed disappointment with the industry that they had created 
less than a decade earlier. They started to ask for new legislations that allowed for more 
effective monitoring of SBICs investment activities and stricter control of how SBICs 
nourished small businesses. In the mid-1960s, SBA implemented a series of new rules 
including stricter reporting standards and more frequent reviews of SBICs. Starting in the 
end of 1965, SBICs were also required to file a yearly report with SBA on the 
performance of all portfolio companies.  
From a review of the SBIC industry, the SBA administrator Boutin concluded in 
1967 that smaller SBICs are particularly problematic for the industry. He suggested that 
―inadequate resources tend to tempt smaller companies into violations of the regulation as 
a means of making ends meet‖ (Congress 1967, p 8) As a response to these problems, 
Mr. Boutin proposed a bill that among other things would  increase the minimum size of 
SBICs and drastically reduce the number of firms in the SBIC industry. The bill was 
supported among other by Mr. Stewart representing the National Association of Small 





Congressman Widnall (R-NJ) who emphasized that smaller SBICs tend to fund smaller 
merchants and manufacturers than larger SBICs. The problem, Mr. Widnall argued, was 
not the size of the SBICs, but rather their ability to make investments. ―I heard there was 
such a rush to get money out that almost anybody who walked in for a charter could get 
one‖, Mr. Windnall claimed (Congress 1966a, p 46). Mr. Boutin agreed that experience 
of investments and management skills should be important licensing criteria and added 
that personal interviews recently had been included in the protocol for approving SBIC 
licensees. As new problems were identifies in the industry, policy-makers typically 
responded with regulatory amendments and more detailed rules. 
Yet, the implementations of new regulation turned out to be challenging in the 
SBIC industry. The SBA Administrator Boutin state in a hearing from 1967: ―I have been 
distressed to find a large number of companies who just don‘t give a hoot about 
regulation, law, or anything else. They go on their own merry way, companies operating 
out of somebody‘s sun porch or somebody‘s recreation room in the basement‖ (Congress 
1967, pp 54-55). The rules governing the SBIC‘s financing deals in the small business 
community became increasingly stricter during the following years, and many of the 
SBICs that SBA considered to be ―problem cases‖ were put into receivership under a new 
law passed in 1967 or merged into other SBICs.  .  
Along these developments towards more standardized and detailed rules, the 
managers of SBICs made efforts to establish an internal norm system for the emerging 
industry. SBICs asked Congressmen for several legislative changes that would allow 
investors to structure their financing deals based on the professional expertise instead of 





investors and policy-makers alike tried to influence is the selection of appropriate 
investment objects. Policy-makers repeatedly expressed that SBICs should fund 
companies that otherwise would not have access to capital.  Many institutional changes 
reflect policy-makers‘ desire to direct SBICs towards investments in that would foster 
diverse with respect to industries, regions, and social groups. For example, in 1969 a new 
class of SBICs called MESBICs was established that focused on financing of small 
business managed by ―socially and economically disadvantaged businessmen.‖ In a 
hearing in 1972, representatives from the SBIC industry and Congressmen discussed how 
SBIC should structure their investments in minority communities and other 
disadvantaged groups. Congressmen and SBIC investors agreed on the value from 
extending SBICs‘ investments into these types of businesses. Congress approved a bill 
that gave the MESBICs special benefits including lower interest rates and possibilities of 
leveraging their private capital with more government funds (Congress 1972; Congress 
1976).  
In the mid-1970s, debates about appropriate investment objects came to focus on 
the size of the business that received financing. Congressman Addabbo (D-NY) 
questioned Mr. Kobelinski, SBA‘s administrator, about SBICs‘ recent tendency to focus 
on capital intensive high technology industries. He wondered if such startups should be 
classified by small businesses and if they should receive funding from the SBIC industry. 
Mr. Carson, president of a SBIC, held a different opinion. The investment philosophy of 
his company was distinguished from many other SBICs by its focus on few, but larger, 
investments in firms with growth potential. He was concerned about ―the arbitrary 





employees but not one with 251‖. (Congress 1976, p 119) Referring to the general capital 
shortage, he proposed that the program should be expanded beyond the area of small 
businesses. Mr. Flender from MIT Development Foundation that helped to 
commercialize university-developed technologies raised also concerns about SBICs 
inability to fund high technology firms. Congressmen expressed, however, repeatedly 
expectations that the SBIC industry should remain focused on smaller firms. SBICs focus 
on smaller firms spread across regions and a range of industries differentiated SBICs 
from private venture capital firms. 
 A second aspect of SBICs‘ financing arrangements that investors in the industry 
continuously asked Congressmen to reconsider was the formal restrictions on which 
financial instruments that SBICs could use. The initial wordings of the Small Business 
Investment Act of 1958 allowed only investments that used convertible debentures which 
is a form of loans that can be converted into stock. SBA also regulated the interest rates 
that SBICs could charge for loans. Through the National Association of Small Business 
Investment Companies, SBICs started to lobby for more flexible rules in the late 1960s. 
For instance Mr. Davis, vice president of SBICs‘ national industry association NASBIC, 
asked Congressmen in 1967 to define the term equity capital as ―liberally as possible‖ 
(Congress 1967, p 115). In 1980, Mr. Little, president of NASBIC and Mr. Levitt, 
Chairman of American Stock Exchange repeated the call for Amendments to the Small 
Business Investment Act of 1958 to give SBICs more flexibility to design their 
investments  (Congress 1980b). And in 1982, Mr. Rider, president of a SBIC and 
chairman of NASBIC, argued that the industry still was not satisfied with the definitions 





A third dimension of SBICs‘ financing ties with small businesses that was 
debated was SBICs‘ control over the small businesses that they financed. The original 
Small Business Act specified that SBICs could not control the companies that they 
financed. This rule was justified by policy-makers as a means to restrict SBICs‘ power 
compared to small businesses and ensure that  SBICs did not develop into a set of holding 
companies (Congress 1967). By the end of the 1960s, the restrictions had been loosed, 
but SBICs could still not buy more than 49 percent of a small business‘ equity (Congress 
1969). At the same time SBICs were expected to be active investors that helped business 
to reach their goals. Mr. Trisch representing an SBIC discussed this balance in a question 
about his firm‘s interactions with their portfolio companies. ―We get monthly reports, 
again, it depends on the type of company that we are talking about. But if it is a 
manufacturing firm we get a steady flow of information on production, sales, as well as 
the usual type action reports. And we meet with them at least once a month, and very 
often it is weekly.‖ He continued: ―it is a strictly advisory capacity and a learning 
situation. We would like to know at all times what is happening with the company, so 
that if thing go well or things go poorly we know it ahead of time, not at the last minute, 
and therefore we have to make some rash decisions.‖ (Congress 1976, p 146) 
Resolving Conflicts between Private and Societal Interests  
The discussion so far suggests that participants in policy processes can use 
different strategies for justifying how institutions should be structured. I have 
demonstrated in my analysis of the private venture capital and the SBIC industries two 





capital industry, investors used claims about their professional expertise to counteract 
tendencies towards stricter regulations. Investors in the venture capital industry were 
critical to the limitations set up by formal institutions, and they lobbied for institutional 
changes that would better suit their goals. These changes included amendments to ERISA 
which forced venture capital firms to focus on less risky investment targets, cuts in 
capital gain taxes which made equity investments more profitable, and other smaller 
regulatory adjustments especially to SEC rules that made it easier for holder of private 
equity to hold control positions and later liquidate their investments. Private venture 
capitalists were able to change several institutional arrangements to their favor by 
pointing to their expertise in spurring entrepreneurship. Compare the developments in the 
private venture capital industry to those in the SBIC industry. The SBIC industry was 
increasingly regulated during the 1960s and 1970s. Policy-makers were dissatisfied with 
the performance of the SBICs and argued that they were too focused on their private 
interests. As a result policy-makers developed new regulations that prescribed how 
SBICs should select targets, structure their deals, and work with the companies that they 
funded. 
These findings suggest that the outcome of institutional processes depends on the 
strategies that participants in policy-processes use to resolve conflicts between firms‘ 
private interests and societal goals. Polanyi (1944) suggested long ago that market 
arrangements tend to become stable structures when economic life interlocks with other 
aspects of society including politics, region, and family life. Similarly my findings 
emphasize that research on inter-firms networks and institutional developments needs to 





In the venture capital industry, I find that investors‘ attempts to shape institutions were 
closely associated with a more general effort to promote a view of venture capital 
investments as beneficial to the society as a whole. During the Cold War era, venture 
capital investments were depicted as an important means to develop new technologies 
and increase international competitiveness. As the oil crises unfolded in the 1970s, the 
impact of venture capital financing on the development of new technologies for energy 
conservation became important. The economic slow-down during that decade made also 
claims speaking to job creation and economic growth politically attractive. Consider for 
example, the conclusions of a task force on venture and equity capital in 1977 that states: 
―unless we keep risk capital flowing into new enterprises, our economic progress and 
competitiveness in world markets will erode and young people will be denied 
opportunity‖ (Congress 1977, p 17). These types of statements about venture capitalists‘ 
efforts to grow small businesses, in particular firms in high technology industries, were 
often used as evidence for the broader social impact of that type of financing arrangement 
and these justifications helped investors to mobilize support in Congress for their ideas 
about institutional arrangements. 
In the SBIC industry, in contrast, tensions were stronger between people who 
believed in the value of SBICs‘ investments and those who did not. The structures of the 
market, instead of becoming stable institutions, continued for decades to be subject for 
political debates. Advocates for the SBIC industry argued that the SBIC program had 
―paid good dividends to the Government‖. Further advocates suggested that the capital 
that SBICs provided to small businesses created new jobs and larger businesses which in 





of an SBIC argued ―I‘d like to point out that in starting this SBIC, and I was one of the 
investment bankers, we really thought we were doing a civic service‖  (Congress 1977, p 
171). But while the goals of the SBICs were desired, critical voices pointed to the gap 
between these formal goals and SBICs‘ practices. For example, Senator Rees questions in 
a hearing from 1967 the value SBIC financing: ―I have heard criticism that a great many 
SBIC‘s are engaging primarily in speculative investments that really do nothing for the 
economy, primarily real estate loans […] I think that many of us realize there are several 
types of businesses, but when we talk about small business you are usually talking about 
small business that adds to the gross national product of the country‖ (Congress 1967, p 
73)  
To summarize, tensions between private interests and societal goals were hard to 
resolve in the SBIC industry. Several of the hearings emphasized the need for continued 
revision of the institutional arrangements that governed SBICs‘ relations with small 
businesses to protect the entrepreneurs that received funds, the private investors that 
invested in SBICs, as well as the federal funds that SBICs‘ had access to. Policy-makers 
described the need for regulation as pressing, and they questioned professional norms and 
investors‘ expertise. The stated goal from the side of Congress and the SBA was to learn 
from experience and constantly improve the framework under which SBICs provided 
financing to entrepreneurs. As problems were identified, solutions were codified into 
formal institutional arrangements. These in turn were enacted in SBICs‘ interactions with 
small businesses and then reported back to the Congress as illustrative examples. Formal 





Over time, members of the SBIC industry asked less frequently for more 
autonomy and flexibility. Instead they agreed with a majority of the policy-makers that 
formal institutions were needed to improve the legitimacy of the highly criticized 
industry. A quote from 1977 by Mr Osley, president-elect of the National Association of 
Small Business Investment Companies (NASBIC), illustrates such efforts to update 
formal institutions: ―… the SBIC program has now been in existence for over 18 years 
and it has not been as successful as either the Congress or the industry itself would have 
wished. […] On the other hand, I believe that the SBIC concept continues to be sound. 
[…] Surely, our joint failure to solve the entire problem should not lead us to scrap the 
experiment. Rather we must learn from our experience and proceed further along the 
partnership road to multiply the successes we have enjoyed the past 18 years‖ (Congress 
1977, p 68-69). 
Over time, investors in the SBIC industry also learned to work with the law 
instead of questioning institutional arrangements as investors did in the private venture 
capital industry.  In the late 1960s, Boutin, administrator for SBA, praised SBICs run by 
banks for their ability to develop professional practices that aligned with formal 
institutions and the goals of the government. He said ―[…] Bank-affiliated companies 
have shown substantial success utilizing the provision of law that this program has to 
offer […] Our major problems are with those closely held corporations owned by 
families, whole owned by families or individuals where they invested their money where 
it looked like an opportunity to get rich quickly and they found out that wasn‘t so, and 
they started to take shortcuts, and these shortcuts have got the agency in trouble, got the 





time, bankers‘ entry into the SBIC industry was not liked by many politicians who feared 
professional control and a new bank monopoly. In 1969, a bill was passed in Congress 
that restricted banks ownership in SBICs to no more than 49 percent (Congress 1969, p 
3). 
Discussion and Implications 
My empirical analysis has demonstrates how policy-makers and interest groups 
can use arguments based in professional expertise to influence the institutions that govern 
inter-organizational relations. I have uncovered how such arguments operate along with 
tendencies towards formalization to shape institutions in two related industries. The 
results reveal that formal scripts and professional expertise are associated with two 
models for how to structure institutions. Formalization is a process that generates new 
and more detailed guidelines for how organizations could, and in some cases should, 
relate to one another. These processes were particularly salient in the SBIC industry 
where a large number of actors asked for stricter regulations in the wake of a number of 
industry scandals and high bankruptcy rates. Professionalization, in contrast, 
decentralizes the control over financing activities to groups of experts. Claims regarding 
expert controls where found in the SBIC industry, but even more so among the private 
venture capital firms. Investors asked for flexibility to design the ways that venture 
capital financing was organized. They did so by referring to their expertise in the field of 
risky small business investments. 
The second part of my analysis has uncovered how participants in policy arenas 





financing in small businesses should be organized. In the private venture capital industry, 
central actors were able show how the financing tie between venture capitalists and small 
businesses can contribute to socially and economically valued categories including 
technological innovations, job creation, and international competitiveness. Thus venture 
capitalists‘ financing ties with small business becomes seen as public goods that not only 
benefited the venture capital firms and the company that received funds, but also 
contributed to collectively desired outcomes. Private venture capital firms claimed the 
right to share the returns of successful companies, based on the ability to absorb risk, 
provide long-term financing, and other services to the small business and by offering 
benefits to the society as a whole. 
In the SBIC industry, tensions firms‘ private interests and societal goals were 
harder to reconcile and organizations struggled for a long time to find ways to bridge 
different ideas for how SBICs should support the small business community. Unlike 
private venture capitalists‘ relations with small businesses, SBICs‘ relations became 
increasingly disentangled from other market arrangements and the relevance and 
professional basis of this financing arrangement was deeply questioned. With subsequent 
support from the state and mobilization in the financial community, SBICs continued to 
be involved in the financing of small businesses but as my analysis will show, the 
meaning shifted towards a more conservative view of how SBICs and small businesses 
should interact. These findings underscore that efforts to embed market relations in a 
societal context influence actors‘ ability to shape the meaning of ties. 
At this point some comments about the theoretical implications of my work are 





organizational relations rather than the actual formation and management of ties. This 
approach to explaining network evolution differs significantly from many prior studies 
that predominately focus on which pairs of organizations are likely to form relations with 
one another and how those processes aggregate into global structures. I believe that 
research on about the institutions that govern inter-organizational relations is a valuable 
complement to traditional structural analyses that help us to understand why some 
relational arrangements are more likely to be observed in a market than others. My work 
seeks to explain how firms interact with policy-makers to shape regulations and other 
policies that subsequently influence firms‘ interactions with other firms. I find that firms‘ 
strategies for justifying claims in policy arenas have an effect on institutional 
developments. This finding has implications for research on the institutional context of 
inter-firms relations, since it show that firms themselves have a role in shaping that 
context. While future research definitely is needed to explain how regulatory changes 
affects firms‘ networks of social and economic relationships, I believe that my work takes 
steps toward a richer theoretical account of how institutions and inter-firm networks 
evolve over time. 
Conclusions 
Recent research in organization theory and economic sociology has directed our 
attention to the idea that firms‘ networks are institutionally embedded in cognitive 
understandings, norms and regulation. Studies show that institutional changes have 
significant implications for the properties of structural arrangements (Powell, White, 





institutions change. The analysis presented in the present paper starts addressing this 
theoretical gap by explaining how the institutions that govern inter-firm relations come 
into being. I use formal policy-making in the U.S. Congress as a window for 
understanding institutional emergence and change. In doing so, I also answer to calls for 
more research on the processes influence how relations in a network are organized in 
different markets and historical periods (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Krippner 2001).  
My findings show that representatives of interest groups and policy makers can 
use many different forms of arguments to shape the institutional context that govern 
firms‘ interactions. Especially my work emphasizes the importance of assertions 
grounded in professional expertise. Professional claims can solve tensions between firms‘ 
private interests and broader societal goals. These tensions are important in policy 
processes since regulators often need to satisfy many groups at the same time. This 
finding is interesting since it reframes a central discussion in organization theory and 
economic sociology about the relation between the economy and society (Krippner and 
Alvarez 2007). Whereas much research on network in market tend to view the social and 
the economic as distinct spheres, my argument points to the value of increased 
convergence between the network literature‘s conception of embeddedness (Granovetter 
1985) and Polanyi‘s (1944) classical statement that markets needs to be understood as a 
part of society. I demonstrate that networks of inter-firm relations depend on their 





CHAPTER 3: CAREER EXPERIENCES AND EMERGENT NETWORK 





The paper contributes to the literature on network evolution by examining how 
managers‘ prior career experiences shape firms‘ propensity to collaboration in a young 
industry. While prior network research has focused on the reproduction of relational patterns 
within mature industries, my study demonstrates that firms in young industries make 
decisions about collaboration based on their managers‘ experiences in other social contexts. 
Drawing on an analysis of the U.S. venture capital industry in 1970-1988, I demonstrate that 
firms with more commercial bankers preferred a model of sole investments despite a general 
trend in the industry towards more collaborative investments. The finding highlights the 
importance of a theory about network evolution that takes into account the differential 
understandings of collaboration as a means to explain why firms sort into differential 
network positions.  
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 It is hard not to notice the important role that social and economic networks play 
in contemporary industries. The well-documented effects of networks on firms‘ outcomes 
(e.g. Ahuja 2000a; Davis 1991; Uzzi 1996) have recently motivated scholars to examine 
how relational patterns in an industry develop and change over time. In response to calls 
for a more historicized and dynamic network theory in the social sciences (Emirbayer and 
Goodwin 1994; Watts 2004), a new strand of research has identified a range of social and 
economic mechanisms that influence the formation and dissolution of network ties, 
including firms‘ attributes, existing relations, and physical location (for an overview see 
Rivera, Soderstrom, and Uzzi 2009). A common theme running across these studies is the 
idea that established industry arrangements tend to stabilize and perpetuate existing 
network structures (cf. White 1981). Because written contracts are incomplete (Macaulay 
1963) and the value of collaboration depends on contingencies that are difficult to 
anticipate (Gulati and Higgins 2003; Mizruchi, Stearns, and Marquis 2006), firms often 
rely on information from their current partners (Gulati 1994) and shared informal 
understandings (Larson 1992; Owen-Smith and Powell 2004) when they make 
collaborative decisions. Firms‘ networks are therefore contingent on a history of past 
collaboration within the industry (Marquis 2003). 
Yet not all industries have their own institutionalized history. Even if young firms 
in dynamic industries are those that benefit the most from affiliations with other firms 
(Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman 2000; Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr 1996; Stuart, 





emergence of such relations. Young industries are fluid social structures where firms 
often carry a range of ideas for manage interactions with other organizations (Kreiner and 
Schultz 1993; Powell, White, Koput, and Owen-Smith 2005). They form therefore a 
context that forces us to move beyond current theories about network evolution to take 
into consideration why firms develop certain understandings of when collaboration is a 
valuable strategy. The objective of the present paper is to build an account for why some 
firms are more likely to form collaborative relations with competing firms, and why some 
firms resist collaborative strategies.  
My argument highlights in particular the impact of managers‘ prior career 
experiences on emergent conceptions of network ties. This argument is inspired by 
literatures in organization theory and entrepreneurship which suggest that managers‘ 
prior experiences influence how firms conceive possible strategies (Boeker 1997; 
Fligstein 1990; Kraatz and Moore 2002). Managers‘ career experiences are especially 
important in locales and times when industry structures are not taken for granted 
(Fligstein 1990) such as young industries. Under these conditions, managers from 
different backgrounds tend to have diverging understandings of strategies and when they 
are appropriate to use. Drawing on these insights, I propose that managers‘ prior career 
experiences in other established industries influence firms‘ propensity to engage in 
collaboration with other firms. I conceptualize managers‘ prior career experiences as a set 
of cognitive frames that have important ramifications for the network of inter-firm 
relations that a firm develops over time.  
In what follows, I develop my theoretical argument in an empirical analysis of 





venture capitalists, instead of making deals alone. Venture capital firms offer an 
important source of funding for start-up companies, and especially for entrepreneurial 
endeavors that break from existing practices and technologies (Gompers and Lerner 
1999). Over time, U.S. venture capitalists‘ shared work on deals has generated a dense 
industry-wide network that is a channel for capital and information (Kogut, Urso, and 
Walker 2007). Today, firms depend on central positions in this relational infrastructure 
for their survival. Venture capital firms that work together in investment syndicates tend 
to have higher financial returns (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu 2007), and entrepreneurs 
that receive funds from central venture capitalists are more likely to experience 
successful public stock offerings (Megginson and Weiss 1991; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels 
1999).   
Yet as Lerner (1994) has noted, venture capital firms‘ decisions to collaborate on 
investments represent a complex strategy that is driven by a range of different motives. 
Whereas the networks of the venture capital industry are today often viewed as natural 
and desired infrastructures that enable small businesses to survive and grow, a very 
different picture arise especially if we return to the early days of the industry. In the 
1960s, the venture capital industry was still constituted by a set of loosely connected 
firms (Kogut, Urso, and Walker 2007) that frequently operated relatively independently 
of other investors. Syndicated deals among venture capitalists, while they existed, were 
by no means routinized practices and many firms resisted to engage in collaboration. My 
paper suggests that people with experience from commercial banking and investment 
banking were especially influential in shaping firms‘ propensity to collaborate with other 





a well known strategy that they long had been used for deals related to large corporation. 
Commercial bankers in contrast were used to working alone when offering financing to 
companies. I anticipate that investment bankers and commercial bankers used these two 
distinct cultural understanding for how to pursue financial activities, which in turn lead 
their firms to develop different positions in the emerging network of co-investment 
relations.  
Managers’ Career Experiences and Emergent Network Structures  
Researchers in the field of organizational theory have long recognized that young 
industries differ from mature ones. Organizational ecologists argue that firms in young 
industries face a special set of challenges, since other organizations are not familiar with 
their practices (Aldrich and Fiol 1994). Before the industry become a widely viewed as a 
recognized and legitimate market niche, organizations try out a multitude of business 
models, often without success (Hannan and Carroll 1992). Similarly institutional scholars 
have suggested that organizations in novel contexts often face competing models for how 
to organize their activities (DiMaggio 1991; Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, and King 1991). 
Network scholars, in contrast, have so far paid limited attention to the special nature of 
young industries. Indeed network theories have long been criticized for their excessively 
abstract and acontextual treatment of social structures (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; 
Krippner 2001; Sewell 1992). 
Inspired by prior work, we can nevertheless expect that firms in young industries 
face a special set of challenges when interacting with other organizations. Studies have 





and recognition from external stakeholders (Aldrich and Fiol 1994; Sine, Haveman, and 
Tolbert 2005). Other empirical works suggest that firms in novel contexts are frequently 
forced to change their collaborative strategies in response to factors beyond their own 
control, including technological breakthroughs, regulations, and competitive pressures 
(Madhavan, Koka, and Prescott 1998; Powell, White, Koput, and Owen-Smith 2005). 
Given these dynamics in the initial stages of an industry, we need to develop a more 
nuanced theoretical account of network dynamics. Theory should take into consideration 
that firms in young industries often face multiple competing pressures when they interact 
with partners. In the present paper, I move in this direction by highlighting how 
managers‘ prior career experiences shape collaborative decisions. 
Managers‘ formal training and experiences is an important asset for young firms 
(Robinson and Sexton 1994). In addition to human capital in the form of expertise, their 
social connections offer a resource that the firm can draw on in its interactions with other 
organizations (Hallen 2008; Shane and Stuart 2002). Finally, and most importantly for 
my argument, managers bring with them capabilities that help firms to navigate and make 
sense of existing networks in an industry. Though managers‘ experiences are often not 
thought of as cognitive frames, they do guide how firms make collaborative decisions. 
Kogut (2000) has captured this argument nicely by proposing a model of networks as 
knowledge structures. A firm‘s participation in a network depends on its understanding of 
how cooperation is organized in an industry. Managers‘ prior experiences are likely to 
provide start-ups with access to these implicit rules. 
Kogut‘s model presupposes that an industry is linked to a relatively bounded pool 





to create value. This assumption is put into question by a stream of work in the field of 
entrepreneurship. Not all people in an industry come from the same background (Burton, 
Sørensen, and Beckman 2002), which by extension means that firms‘ often have 
diverging understandings of collaborative strategies. Diversity tends to be particularly 
high in young industries due to the limited group of people who possess industry specific 
experiences. Firms in newer and expanding industries are therefore often forced to 
compete with companies in other sectors for talented managers and employees with 
proper skill sets (Sørensen 2004). One by product of the competition for managers is that 
firms in young industries often employ managers with experiences from other sectors 
who carry distinct ideas for how to build relationships with other firms. 
Thus as managers‘ move into new social domains, they alter incrementally the 
strategic tools that organizations in a young industry have available (Baty, Evan, and 
Rothermel 1971; DiMaggio 1991; Hwang and Powell 2009). Prior empirical work has 
found that managers‘ career backgrounds shape which opportunities firms identify and 
explore in the market place, including product offerings (Boeker 1997; Kraatz and Moore 
2002). Fligstein (1990) takes this argument even further by claiming that the background 
of an organizations‘ executives influence the very mindset that exist in an organization. 
Prior experiences shape the means that managers use to diagnose problems, identify 
solutions, and implement change. My research draws on Fligstein‘s work on how career 
backgrounds can influence decisions about corporate strategies. I expect that strategic 
decisions about when and how to collaborate with other firms should depend on the 
experiences that managers bring with them into firms. Managers‘ backgrounds influence 





complements to practical concerns and collective habits (Emirbayer and Mische 1998). 
By turning to an analysis of the venture capital industry, I will next elaborate on my 
general theoretical proposition and develop my hypotheses.  
Venture Capitalists’ Experiences in Traditional Finance 
The first U.S. venture capital firms were formed after the end of World War II. 
These firms were organized efforts to explore opportunities in a market niche that 
historically had been dominated by wealthy individuals (Gupta 2000; Hsu and Kenney 
2005; Reiner 1989). The first generation of venture capital firms was a mixed group of 
organizations managed by founders who had ―unusual backgrounds and goals‖ (Reiner 
1989, p 126). Many of the pioneering venture capital investors were strongly influenced 
by the war experience, excited about new technologies, and committed to the 
development of local communities (Gupta 2000). They often had limited experience in 
professional investing, and entered into small business financing after careers in 
universities, government agencies, manufacturers, law firms, and their own start-ups 
(Gupta 2000). Personal taste played an important role and venture capitalists explored a 
multitude of investment styles to grow start-ups into established and profitable 
corporations. Deals were made in expanding technological markets such as aviation, 
chemicals, and electronics, but also in other niches that today are less associated with 
venture capital such as film, real estate, and frozen food (Bygrave and Timmons 1992; 
Reiner 1989).  
Initially the traditional financial community saw venture capital investments as a 





late 1960s, when people with experience in investment banking and commercial banking 
showed increased interest in venture capital and a large number of new firms were 
founded. Two factors explain why people from traditional financial sectors became 
involved in venture capital in this period. First, during a time of booming stock markets, 
bankers were looking to explore new market segments, and small business investments 
was one area where banks had relatively limited presence since the great depression in 
the 1930s. Second, the passing of the Small Business Investment Act in 1958 made it 
attractive for banks to form independent venture capital subsidiaries, since such 
subsidiaries could leverage private funds with federal loans (Noone and Rubel 1970). In 
1971, venture capitalist Charles Lea, Jr. described that the entry by people from major 
financial institutions into venture capital had generated significant innovations in the 
industry. Venture capital firms, Lea stated, were increasingly managed by professional 
staffs able to ―assess and measure the risks and probabilities in a situation more rapidly 
and with greater technical efficiency than ever before‖ (Lea 1971, p 298).  
Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, venture capital firms explored and 
adopted several investment techniques, and a distinct venture capital model started to 
take shape. One aspect of this model was firms‘ increased involvement in investment 
syndicates. An investment syndicate is a group of venture capital firms that makes a deal 
together in a company. The deal is usually structured by a lead firm which organizes the 
syndicate. Historical evidence suggests that the practice of syndicated investments has 
been used by venture capital firms since the 1948 when American Research & 
Development (AR&D) and Rockefeller Brothers together made an unsuccessful 





demonstrate in my result section, the frequency with which venture capital firms 
syndicated deals in the 1970s and early 1980s was something that previously had not 
been seen in the industry. As a result, venture capital firms became tied together in a 
large network of co-investment relations. 
I expect that several factors contributed to firms‘ engagement in investment 
syndicates. Financial constraints and the move towards capital intensive industries were 
clearly important factors that pushed venture capital firms to pull resources into 
syndicates in order to make investments. Moreover, I anticipate that firms‘ propensity to 
collaboration in investment syndicates depended on their managers‘ prior career 
experiences in banking. Investment syndicates had long been a common practice in the 
field of investment banking. Lerner (1994), for example, has pointed out that banks had 
collaborated on stock underwriting before the venture capital industry even was 
established. One early example of a syndicated deal among banks cited by Lerner was the 
Pennsylvania Railroad‘s stock offering in 1870. After the passing of the Glass-Steagall 
act in 1933 which separated between investment banking and commercial banking, the 
practice of syndication survived among investment banks as a means to spread risk, gain 
access to valuable information, and share monitoring responsibilities. Thus for venture 
capitalists with experience in investment banking, the idea of syndicating deals with other 
firms was a well known strategy.  
Commercial bankers had in contrast developed a different model of making 
financial deals. They typically preferred to work with companies associated with lower 
financial risks. They made deals alone instead of working in syndicates with competing 





mindset to the new industry. Reiner (1989, p 392) cites an interview with David Arscott 
who was a leading venture capitalist with experience from the world of commercial 
banking: ―The process [of evaluating venture capital deals] is not radically different from 
the classical investment analysis process  […] If we decided it was good, we would do an 
analysis of the management‘s background, its customers, suppliers, bankers, auditors, 
attorneys, and others involved with the company […] I don‘t think there is anything 
magical about that process. You analyze the financial information that is presented and 
possibly develop some other scenarios… The classical elements haven‘t changed.‖  
I expect that people with experiences from investment banking and commercial 
banking brought to understanding of how to do investments into venture capital. Venture 
capital managers with experience form investment banking were likely to perceive 
uncertainty before them and engaged in syndicated deals as a solution, since syndicated 
deals long had been used in investment banking. Accordingly, I expect that venture 
capital firms managed by investment bankers have a higher likelihood than other firms to 
form investment syndicates. Managers with experience from commercial banking in 
contrast were used to a model where they offered financing alone. I expect that firms with 
such managers were less likely than other firms to engage in investment syndicates 
despite a general trend in the venture capital industry towards more collaboration. I 
suggest the following two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Venture capital firms with more managers from investment 







Hypothesis 2 (H2): Venture capital firms with more managers from commercial 
banking had a lower propensity to syndicate investments with other venture 
capital firms 
Data and Method 
To test my predictions about the impact of managers‘ career experiences on firms‘ 
decisions to cooperate, I constructed a longitudinal dataset based on multiple data 
sources. I obtained data on venture capital firms from the VentureXpert database. My 
analyses include all firms that have made at least one investment in a U.S based 
company. For the purpose of this study, I focus on data for the years 1970 to 1988.  Prior 
network research about this industry (Kogut, Urso, and Walker 2007) as well as historical 
accounts (Reiner 1989) suggest that this period is critical for understanding how 
contemporary patterns of co-investments were established. In this time, many venture 
capital firms were founded and many practices that are used in the industry today took 
shape. The financial crisis by the end of the 1980s demonstrated the institutionalization of 
the industry as well as the relative robustness of the newly developed network structures. 
The dependent variable for my analysis is a measure of firm‘s propensity to 
syndicate deals in each year. Each venture capital deal is structured by a lead investor. 
The lead investor decides, among other things, whether or not to invite other firms into an 
investment syndicate. For each firm and year, my dependent variable is calculated as the 
share of deals with the firm as a lead investor that was syndicated with other firms. 





investor in each company. First, firm is treated as the lead investor if it was the only firm 
involved in the first venture capital found. Second, if more than one venture capital firm 
was involved in the first round, I define the lead investor as the company that invested in 
all investment rounds before the company went public, was acquired or went bankrupt. I 
exclude cases where no lead investor could be identified based on the two criteria. 
To assess my hypotheses about the effect of manager‘s prior career experiences 
on firms‘ propensity to collaborate, I collected data on all officers and general partners of 
the venture capital firms in my sample. Officers and general partners were identified from 





Firms without listings in the Pratt‘s Guide were excluded from my analyses. Data on 





 edition), Marquis Who‘s Who database, and biographies that insiders have filed 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The resulting dataset includes close to 
15,000 prior affiliations of venture capital managers. These data provide a unique source 
for understanding how early venture capitalists moved across organizational affiliations 
inside and outside the industry. Based on these data, I code a manager as having prior 
experience in banking if the person had at least one prior position, aside from summer 
internships, in an investment bank or a commercial bank. For each firm and year, I 
construct two variables: the number of people with experience in investment banking and 
the number of people with experience in commercial banking. I use these variables to test 
my two hypotheses that firms with managers from investment banking were more likely 
to syndicate investments than other firms, and that firms with managers from commercial 





number of managers associated with the firm in that year to account for the fact that firms 
vary in how many managers they have. 
All models also include several control variables that are likely to explain why a 
firm chose to collaborate instead of investing alone. An important alternative explanation 
for why venture capital firms engage in investment syndicates relates to resource 
constraints. Investment syndicates, this functional argument suggests, are means for 
venture capital firms to pool capital and make investments that they could not make 
without the support of other firms. To account for the effect of resource constraints, I 
create a variable that measures the age of youngest fund managed by the firm. Firms 
typically use the capital in a fund during the early years of the fund‘s life span to make 
investments. I therefore expect that firms with older funds are more likely to face capital 
constraints and hence also more likely to invest with partners. I also include a variable for 
average investment round to control for resource constraints. Venture capital firms are 
known to be more likely to syndicate investments in later stages since those rounds often 
require more capital. Moreover firms that participate in earlier rounds have an incentive 
to invite additional firms in subsequent rounds to a premium price (Gompers and Lerner 
1999).  
I also expect that a firm‘s propensity to collaborate depends on its recent track 
record of investment success. Venture capital firms can generate returns in two forms of 
liquidity events. First, the investment becomes liquid when the company that received 
financing becomes publically traded via an initial public offer (IPO). Second, an 
investment becomes liquid when a company is acquired by another company. For each 





acquisition in the firms‘ investment portfolio in the period year. The variable is highly 
skewed and I take therefore the natural logarithm of this measure before including it into 
my analysis.  
I further include a set of variables that measures the firm‘s investment profile. I 
control of the degree to which the firm is an industry generalist with an inverse 
Herfindahl index. The Herfindahl index sums the squared proportion of investments in 
each of the eighteen two-digit level VEIC industries over the prior ten years. The index 
ranges from 1 to k, where k denotes the number of industries. Firms with high values of 
the index are industry generalists whereas firms with lower values are specialists. I also 
control for the extent to which the firm invests in capital intensive industries to take into 
account industry focus and constrains stemming from a large share of investments in 
capital intensive industries. I operationalize the idea of industry effects by including two 
variables that measures the share of the firm‘s total investments that were made in 
information technology (including hardware) and medicine/health. The reference 
category for the industry variables is the proportion of investments in non-high 
technology industries, such as transportation and consumer related goods. Prior research 
also suggests that the venture capital industry is characterized by large regional variations 
(Castilla 2003). I control for the effect of geographic embeddedness by measuring the 
proportion of investments made by a venture capital firm in each geographic region 
during the prior ten years. I group investments into three geographic categories: West 






I also control for the firms existing position in the network. Prior research on 
network evolution has highlighted that firms that are better positioned in the existing 
network structure are more likely to collaborate in subsequent years since they have 
routines for collaboration in place and since they have access to information about 
possible collaborators (Gulati 1994). Central firms are also likely to be attractive as 
collaborators since a firms‘ current network positions offers a signal of status and quality 
(Podolny 2001). To control for this effect, I constructed a network of prior co-
investments between venture capital firms. Two venture capital firms have a tie in this 
network if they have made an investment in the same portfolio company. In contrast to 
my dependent variable which predicts if a firm enters a new investment syndicate, the 
network data reflect the history of co-investments in the venture capital industry. A tie 
lasts until the investment is liquidated through an acquisition or initial public offering. 
For cases with missing end dates, I assume that the investment lasts for ten years since 
many funds are time-limited and liquidated after that time
4
. From these data, I calculate 
network centrality with an eigenvector construct. Eigenvector centrality takes into 
account both a focal firm‘s number of partners and then the centrality of these partners. 
The resulting index reflects the firms‘ position in the global network structure, and it is 
often used to measure the extent that a firm can leverage its structural position to gain 
information, power, and status benefits (Freeman 1978/1979). The network centrality 
                                                 
4 To confirm the validity of the ten-year cut off, I tested the likelihood that a firm made an investment t 
years after its last investment. After ten years of inactivity, the probability that the firm invests in a 





measures were calculated with the igraph package in R using yearly cross-sections of the 
relational dataset. 
From these data, I estimate the propensity to syndicate deals for each firm and 
year. I use a set of Heckman selection models, since firms differ in their likelihood to 
make any deals as a lead investor and since investment activities tend to be clustered in 
time with no investments made in some years. The first stage of my models (the selection 
stage) estimates the likelihood that a firm makes any deals as a lead investor in a year. 
The major variable in this part of the model is the time since the firms made its most 
recent investment. After raising a new fund, venture capital firms typically enter into 
phase when they scout new deals and make investments. Firms in this stage tend to have 
more capital available which makes it more likely to be a lead investor. After this period, 
the fund‘s managers focus instead their attention on supporting their portfolio companies 
and moving them towards public offerings or acquisitions (Gompers and Lerner 1999). I 
therefore expect that duration since the most recent investment is a good variable for 
predicting the probability that a firm will structure a new investment as a lead investor. I 
also include my variable for liquidity events since firms with higher performance tend to 
have more capital to generate new deals. I also include my variables for generalist and 
network status since firms that invest in a large number of industries and that have high 
status are more likely to learn about new investment opportunities. 
Thereafter, the second stage of my models estimates the proportion of those 
investments that were made in a syndicate conditional on the likelihood that the firms 
made any investments as a lead investor. To reduce concerns about the temporal priority 





effects in both stages of my models to control for the effect of economic, political, and 
legal climate on firms‘ investment practices. Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 show descriptive 
statistics and bivariate correlations for all variables included in my analyses. 
 































As already proposed, venture capital firms were in the 1970s and early 1980s 
increasingly investing in syndicates instead of making deals as sole investors. Figure 3.1 
is based on my dataset and it shows the annual proportion of deals that were syndicated 
among two or more firms. The figure confirms the historical evidence that syndicates, 
while they existed before, increased in frequency during the 1970s. In the mid-1980s, 










In Table 3.3, I present results from the analysis of differences in firms‘ propensity 
to invest in syndicates. I assess the statistical significance of associations with a 
conventional two tailed 95 % confidence interval. The lower panel of Table 1 shows the 
effects on the likelihood that the firm made any deals as a lead investor. I find as 
expected a string effect of the duration since the firm‘s most recent investment. Firms 
with more years since their last investments are significantly less likely to make any deals 
as a lead investor. I further find support for the arguments that firm‘s are more likely to 
act as lead investors when they have higher financial performance, are industry 
generalists, and have higher status in the existing network.  
Against that background, consider the upper panel of Table 3.3 which estimates 
the propensity of a firm to syndicate investments conditional upon making any deals as a 
lead investor. Model 1, which presents the effects of the control variables on the 
probability that a firm invests together with partners. This model provides partial 
evidence for the functional idea that venture capital firms enter syndications in response 
to resource constraints. As funds become older, firms tend to have less capital available 
for investments. Model 1 shows that firms with older funds are more likely to syndicate 
deals which can be explained by the limited capital available for making investments. 
The results show that firms with a high proportion of investments in the IT sector, 
relative to non high-tech sectors, are more likely to form investment syndicates. The IT 
sector includes capital intensive industries such as hardware and semiconductors, and the 












Another alternative explanation for firms‘ propensity to collaborate focuses on the 
culture of different geographic regions. I find that firms on the West Coast are 
significantly more likely to make investments in syndicates than firms in the other 
regions (excluding Northeast). Interestingly, there is no significant difference between 
firms in the Northeast and other U.S. regions despite the fact that the area around Boston 
was one of locales which large number of early venture capital firms. Finally, I find in 
Model 1 support for the idea that firms‘ propensity to collaborate is influenced by their 
status and centrality in the network of prior collaboration. This finding is in line which 
work that suggests that network evolution is an endogenous process where firms use their 
current ties to search for information about new collaborators (Gulati 1994). Consistent 
with prior work, I find that firms in central network positions are more likely to enter into 
investment syndicates. This finding extends the existing literature by suggesting that 
structural path dependencies are also important in young industries where networks are 
emergent and rapidly changing.  
Model 2-4 test my hypotheses by introducing the variables for how many 
managers the firm has from investment banking and commercial banking. I predicted in 
my first hypotheses that firms with more managers from investment banking have a 
higher propensity to collaborate on investments. I find no support for this idea in my 
analysis. Firms with more investment bankers were not more likely to collaborate on 
deals despite the fact that investment bankers had been using syndicates in other contexts 
for a long time.   
My second hypothesis predicted that firms with more managers from commercial 





commercial banking were used to a financial model where syndicates where not a major 
component. Since managers are likely to use practices that that have experience with in 
other contexts as they enter new industries, I expect firms with more commercial bankers 
to be less likely to syndicate deals with other firms. Model 3 and 4 offers empirical 
support for this hypothesis.  
To summarize, the general idea that manager‘s career experiences influence 
firms‘ propensity to collaborate with other firms receives partial support. Investment 
bankers did not make firms more likely to collaborate. Firms with the highest propensity 
to collaborate on investments were those with a high share of investments on the West 
Coast and central positions in the existing network of co-investment relations. I find, 
however, that more managers with experiences from commercial banking made firms less 
likely to collaborate on investments. In a period when firms increasingly collaborated 
with other firms, firms with more commercial bankers tended to chose a different path. 
They were less likely to engage in syndicates, and developed therefore fewer connections 
to other firms in the industry.  
Discussion and Implications 
I demonstrate in this paper how a network of co-investing firms was established 
in the venture capital industry. The analysis extends prior research on the evolution of 
networks by taking into account the special processes that influence emergent structures 
in young industries. The results provide some evidence for the proposition that firms‘ 
decisions of whether or not to cooperate with partners are contingent on managers‘ 





collaborate had important implications for individual venture capital firms, 
entrepreneurial start-ups, and the industry as a whole. Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3 below 
illustrate the aggregate outcome of venture capital firms‘ involvement in investment 
syndicates. The network diagram in Figure 3.2 shows the network of co-investments in 
1969. The circle-shaped nodes represent venture capital firms, and the lines between the 
nodes represent collaboration on investments. In the 1960s, the venture capital industry 
was still relatively small. Despite few firms, a factor that tends to increase the likelihood 
of a cohesive industrial community, the network was still very sparse. This network 
diagram can be understood in contrast to the industry‘s structure less than twenty years 
later. Figure 3.3 illustrates the patterns of co-investing venture capital firms in 1986. In 
this year, 94.9 % of all venture capital firms were interconnected in a large network 
component. 25.2 % of the co-investment ties between venture capital firms can be 
classified as strong connections in the sense that the two firms worked together on more 
than one startup company. Venture capital was by this time a relatively established area 
of financial activity. Several well-known venture capital backed start-ups, including 
Microsoft, moved from private equity financing to public capital markets in 1986, 








Figure 3.2 The Network of Co-Investing Venture Capital Firms in 1969 
 
 






The analyses discusses in this paper focus on networks as they emerge from 
organizational-level decisions. As argued in the introduction, organizations‘ decisions of 
whether they will cooperate comprise one of two important processes for understanding 
how inter-organizational networks develop. The second process concerns the choice of 
partners. This question will be analyzed in Chapter 4, but it is also important to keep in 
mind when interpreting the results that I have presented. I expect that the pool of possible 
partners may influence a firm‘s decision of whether or not to cooperate. Firms‘ internal 
and unobserved threshold for forming ties is likely to be lower when they operate in 
industries with many attractive collaborators. The decision of whether a firm will 
cooperate with others is therefore not completely independent from the choice of partner. 
To some degree, I control for the pool of available partners with the yearly dummy 
variables. This control variable assumes, however, that all firms in a given year have 
homogenous preferences when it comes to partner selection. This assumption can 
especially be called into question in young and heterogeneous industries. Future research 
is thus needed to better understand how dyadic partner choices interact with 
organizational-level choice regarding cooperation. 
Another scope condition of my paper concerns the focus on young industries. My 
historical analysis of venture capital firms was theoretically motivated by an interest in 
understanding how patterns of business relations take shape when the practices and 
beliefs that guide collaboration cannot be assumed to be shared among firms. I have 
presented some evidence for the idea that managers‘ career backgrounds influenced the 
conditions under which venture capital firms entered into collaboration in the period 





dynamics need to consider. For research on networks in young industries, my study 
implies that we need to better understand the conditions under which people from a 
particular background become influential in a network. Abbott‘s (1988) ecological 
theory, for example, stresses that groups with professional aspirations often have to fight 
intense struggles before they gain control of new task domains. Following his insight, I 
expect that managers‘ influences on relations between firms often are highly political 
processes. Consider, for example, the results from Chapter 2. A series of debates in the 
U.S. Congress in the mid-1960 and 1970s addressed the extent to which venture capital 
firms‘ investment practices should regulated by formal law or professional norms. In 
these debates, investors tried to achieve control over deal structures by linking their 
personal goals to larger social projects including economic growth, job creation, and 
innovation. Proponents for changed rules, in contrast, argued that venture capitalists were 
too risk seeking to be supported by federal means. I anticipate that politics of this form is 
crucial for understanding how inter-organizational relations develop in young industries.  
 My findings also raise a set of questions about how idiosyncratic the U.S. venture 
capital industry may be compared to other social contexts. It is important to keep in mind 
that my analyses are limited to one industry and one form of relations that can exist 
between firms. I present in this sense a case study that documents one out of many 
possible trajectories of network evolution. My intention has been to propose an argument 
that can be tested and modified in future studies. Industries in other national and 
historical contexts are particularly good candidates for subsequent comparative analyses 
about the conditions under which different groups of managers are able to shape the 





patterns emerge in a range of diverse settings, then we will have made important progress 
towards a general theory about network dynamics. 
Conclusions 
In this paper, I have engaged ideas from economic sociology, management and 
strategy to explain how social structures emerge in young industries. I speak to these 
literatures by documenting how one core aspect of an industry– the pattern of inter-
organizational collaboration – develops and takes hold. I show specifically how firms‘ 
practices with respect to collaboration can derive from managers‘ experiences in other 
industries. This finding holds important implications for current theories on the dynamics 
of inter-organizational networks. 
Firstly, my work contributes to theory by highlighting how factors outside an 
industry are important for networks in any particular industry. This insight extends prior 
research which has assumed that industries are demarcated spheres of social and 
economic life. Compared to the existing focus on the mechanisms that reproduce network 
patterns within an industry, I recognized the role of influences across social contexts. For 
young industries especially, reconciling this tension between seeing industries as at the 
same time meaningfully bounded entities and also as permeable fields is crucial for 
understanding how new structures develop. My paper moves therefore beyond the more 
restricted model of path dependency that has guided prior research on how networks 
evolve over time. I emphasize in contrast that networks among firms can develop in 
many different trajectories. I find partial support for the idea that current relations matter, 





different conditions. In young industries especially, we need to pay attention to the range 
of ideas and practices that shape firms‘ collaborative decisions, including those held in 
other industries that are tangential to the one in question.  
Secondly, I contribute to theory by emphasizing the role of manager‘s career 
experiences for emerging network structures. My study demonstrates especially that 
managers can carry ideas about cooperation from one industry to another. A few prior 
studies have argued that networks depend on firms‘ current knowledge basis and learning 
capabilities (Gulati 1999; Kogut 2000). I build on these ideas to show how managers 
from other social contexts may provide a normative and intellectual foundation for 
emergent networks. Managers give organizations access to an established and recognized 
body of knowledge that can be used for structuring collaboration with partners. This 
finding stresses that network evolution cannot be understood apart from the institutions 
that infuse relations with meaning. The result implies that more attention should be 
directed towards the normative meaning systems in which relations are embedded. 
Finally, my results hold important implications for policy-makers. The practice of 
syndicated investments is indeed just one of many possible ways for venture capital firms 
to structure a deal. Yet once venture capital firms started to collaborate, the emerging 
network structures offered new pathways for information and capital flows. The network 
of co-investments has therefore ramifications for how entrepreneurial communities are 
supported. My emphasis on network emergence widens the range of tools that policy-
makers have available to build a structurally cohesive venture capital industry capable of 
funding different forms of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship. By highlighting the role of 





not only requires a favorable economic context, but also a social environment conducive 
to learning. New means for funding entrepreneurship can become sustainable 








CHAPTER 4: THE EFFECTS OF INTEGRATING AND DIFFERENTIATING 
INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES ON NETWORK STRUCTURES: TRADE 




Shared institutional contexts are known to increase the likelihood that pairs of 
individuals or firms form collaborative relations. I extend this idea by theorizing that 
institutional pressures towards structural integration are accompanied by strong pressures 
towards differentiations, since institutions tend to be organized around their members‘ 
collective goals as well as their individual characteristics. An empirical analysis of the 
venture capital industry shows that the positive effect of shared membership in trade 
associations on collaborative investments between firms is mitigated by firm differences 
in geographic focus, targeted clients, and status. The findings imply that institutions 
foster cohesive networks among similar members, but they simultaneously conserve 







Understanding the origins of cohesive networks of social and economic relations 
is of keen theoretical and practical importance. Structural cohesion is known to explain 
individuals‘ (McAdam 1986) and organizations‘ (Mizruchi 1992) propensity to engage in 
collective action, and the levels of creativity and innovation that exist in a field (Uzzi and 
Spiro 2005). Nevertheless, even in very cohesive fields such as academia, social 
networks do not unify all members (Moody 2004). Cohesion is typically highest within 
culturally and politically homogenous clusters, whereas connections tend to be rare 
between dissimilar individuals or organizations (Watts 1999), despite such connections‘ 
importance for information flows (Burt 1992; Granovetter 1974). Thus, an explanation 
for how cohesive networks emerge requires an account of two simultaneous processes: 
First, what are the processes that integrate members of a field and make them more likely 
to form relationships with each other; and second, what are the processes that separate 
between social groups with different characteristics. 
So far most research on structural cohesion has focused on the question of 
integration. There is an old idea in the social sciences that the level of cohesion in a 
society depends on the presence of shared institutional contexts (Durkheim 1933). Field-
wide institutions function as collective ―foci‖ that facilitate the development of social 
bonds by generating opportunities for new encounters and by making people engaged in 
collective endeavors (Feld 1981). Empirical studies find, for example, that college 
students are more likely to form ties with each other when they are in the same 





and Watts 2009), that mothers with children in the same daycare center are likely to 
support each other and become friends (Small 2009), and that economic relationships 
among financial firms depend on shared investment objects (Sorenson and Stuart 2008). 
The belief that shared institutions can foster collaboration between otherwise separated 
groups is also reflected in the structures of many contemporary policy initiatives. For 
instance, interdisciplinary consortia are organized in the sciences to push research 
frontiers, and alliance of governments, firms, and nonprofit organizations have been 
established in the fields of global health and the natural environment to solve complex 
issues such as high childhood mortality rates and global warming. 
 Current accounts for how shared institutions influence collaboration have, 
however, one major weakness. I find this weakness important to address, since it has 
large implications for our understanding of how social networks evolve, especially in 
fields with diverse participants. In what follows, I argue that prior research on the effect 
of institutions on collaboration accurately have captured the integrative power of 
institutions, but often incorrectly downplayed that institutions also are sources of social 
differentiation and stratification. I will demonstrate that the positive effect of shared 
institutional contexts on collaboration only holds when two members already share key 
characteristics that define their identity in the field. The finding implies that institutions 
foster cohesion among similar members, but importantly they also reproduce distinctions 
between different sub-communities. 
My theorizing centers on the idea that integrating and differentiating pressures co-
exist inside institutions. I propose that the two pressures origins from institutions‘ dual 





community, which means that many activities speak to boundary-spanning problems and 
shared cultural understandings. This perspective is found in studies on collective foci and 
networks, which traditionally have focused on institutions ability to highlight 
commonalities (Feld 1981). Yet, on the other hand, members of an institution also seek to 
find roles that speak to their unique interests, which means that they are not equally 
involved in collective activities. For example, a group of prior sociological studies have 
shown that in institutions ranging from technical committees to professional groups, 
distinctions among members are important for understanding how decisions are made and 
how tasks are carried out (Abbott 1988; Ahrne and Brunsson 2008; Farrell and Saloner 
1988; Galaskiewicz 1985). Since integrating and differencing pressures of these types 
often operate at the same time, I propose that institutional pressures often come with 
tensions and tradeoffs that need to be examined in order to understand how institutions 
affect the formation of social and economic relationships.  
 In support of my argument, I present in this paper an empirical analysis of how 
venture capital firms‘ shared membership in trade associations affect their propensity to 
collaborate on investments. Prior research has documented that venture capital firms are 
deeply embedded in networks of jointly made investments in entrepreneurial companies. 
Understanding how those structures formed is critical since venture capital firms‘ 
positions in the co-investment network influence their investment decisions (Sorenson 
and Stuart 2008) and their financial performance (Hochberg, Ljungqvist, and Lu 2007). 
In brief, the empirical results show a positive effect of shared membership in trade 
association on the likelihood that firms collaborate. The effect becomes, however, 





pairwise difference -- measured as overlaps in targeted clients and status differentials -- 
are one standard deviation above the mean, shared membership in trade associations have 
no longer an effect on the likelihood that the firms form collaborative relations with each 
other. 
These empirical findings highlight the general argument of this paper: members 
of a field are not equally influenced by their participation in institutional arenas. This 
finding holds important implications for theorists and policy-makers alike, especially 
those who are interested in bringing together disparate groups. My empirical study 
demonstrates that differentiation occurs in a set of institutions where the members are 
more similar to each other than the average members of the population. If differentiating 
forces play a role in homogenous institutions like the trade associations in the venture 
capital industry, we can expect that differentiating forces are even more important in 
diverse institutions where the interests of individual members are harder to align. My 
work indicates that people involved in the design of these institutions need to overcome 
strong social mechanisms to reach their goal of generating more collaboration between 
existing social cliques. The presence of institutions that bring together diverse people and 
organizations is not a sufficient condition that will not ensure that networks in the field 
become more diverse. Institutions with diversity goals must also find mechanisms that 
overcome pressures towards differentiation. 
Trade Associations and Collaboration among Firms 
The institution in focus of my analysis is trade associations. Trade associations 





member firms (cf. Campbell, Hollingsworth, and Lindberg 1991; Schneiberg 1999), and 
they have often been depicted as a strong integrating force within economic fields. 
Research on governance mechanisms and new technologies have stressed the 
coordinating and standardizing functions of activities in trade associations (Brunsson and 
Jacobsson 2000; Farrell and Saloner 1988) Studies have found that trade associations are 
important in a range of domains, and especially those with technological independencies 
including communication (Rosenkopf and Tushman 1998), transportation (Chandler 
1977), and utilities (Granovetter and McGuire 1998) since firms in such industries have 
an interest in shared guidelines that facilitate distribution and ease consumers‘ adoption 
of the technology. Scholars interested in the political aspects of markets have also paid 
attention to the coordinating role of trade associations. In this literature, trade associations 
are understood as interest groups that firm can use to mobilize collective action and 
influence the structures of an industry (Fligstein 2001; Schneiberg 1999).  
Aside from technological coordination and political mobilization, trade 
associations are also well-known as contexts for networking.  A trade association can in 
this sense be thought of as a collective institution that bring together firms in an industry 
and bolster structural cohesion. While I recognize that many forms of institutions 
including public research organizations  (Owen-Smith and Powell 2004)  and law firms 
(Suchman 2000; Suchman and Cahill 1996) shape collaborative patterns in an industry, 
trade associations are especially important in many industries because of their capacity to 
organize a large number of member organizations simultaneously (Campbell, 
Hollingsworth, and Lindberg 1991). In what follows, I detail how and why I anticipate 





with each other. My argument focuses on the interactions between two forms of pressures 
-- integration and differentiation – which I expect are important for understanding how 
firms are affected by shared membership in institutions. I will use this discussion about 
trade association as a case for understanding the larger theoretical issue of how 
institutions shape network evolution. 
Institutional Pressures towards Integration 
Three inter-related mechanisms explain why institutions in general, and trade 
associations in particular, are expected to have a positive effect on structural cohesion. 
First, individuals or firms who participate in the same institutional context are more likely 
to encounter each other and therefore also more likely to form deeper social or economic 
relationships. Institutions are important for the formation of new relationships because 
they provide individuals and organizations with opportunities to meet other members of 
their field who they otherwise might have been unaware of. This idea is at the core of 
Feld‘s  (1981) now classical work about social foci and interpersonal relationships, and 
many recent studies about shared contexts and network formation (Kossinets and Watts 
2006; Kossinets and Watts 2009; Sorenson and Stuart 2008).  
The insight that institutions shapes networks by enabling new encounters is has 
also been proposed in studies about trade associations. Trade associations often set up 
various networking arenas including meetings, conferences, and more recently interactive 
websites. In these venues, firms develop awareness of each other. For example, technical 
committees are often organized by trade associations, and Rosenkopf and colleagues 





potential partners for future strategic alliances. The effect of shared membership in 
committees on subsequent collaboration is found to be particularly strong when the two 
firms have not worked together in strategic alliances in the past and when the firms lack 
resources to attract collaborators. The authors conclude that firms‘ participation in shared 
industry activities is not only a means to influence technological standards but also ―part 
of a larger strategy for knowledge acquisition and partner identification‖ (p 767). The 
idea that trade associations enables new encounters and interactions is also supported by 
Saxenian‘s (1994) research about the semiconductor industry. Similarly to Rosenkopf 
and colleagues, Saxenian finds evidence that membership in trade associations fosters 
social networks among firms. Social networks explain in turn why some communities 
like the Silicon Valley region have high and sustainable levels of innovation and 
economic growth. 
Second, shared membership in institutions is likely to increase the likelihood of 
relationships by standardizing technologies and practices. Technical coordination and 
standardization is an explicit goal of many associations and committees including trade 
associations  (Farrell and Saloner 1988). Standardized technologies and practices ease 
interactions in several different ways. When individuals and firms use the same 
technologies and practices they find it easier to both communicate and develop shared 
routines for their joint endeavors. Standardized technologies and practices also provide 
members of a market with stronger incentives to collaborate with each other. This 
mechanism fosters cohesion by increasing the average number of ongoing relationships 





likely to form strategic alliances if they use technologies that are similar to many other 
firms.     
A third reason for why institutions are likely to integrate firms in an industry has 
to do with their impact on identities and broader cultural understandings.  One of the 
most important findings in prior research on network formation is that individuals and 
firms tend to interact with partners similar to themselves (Blau 1994; McPherson, Smith-
Lovin, and Cook 2001). In institutions, firms develop perceptions that they are part of the 
same enterprise (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). For example, trade associations and other 
professional grouping often play an important role in defining which practices that are 
legitimate and desired in an industry (Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings 2002). 
Moreover firms‘ engagement in collective action in trade associations highlights firms‘ 
shared goals and identities (Schneiberg 1999). Because trade associations makes it more 
likely that firms see themselves as similar and because firms are likely to chose 
collaborators similar to themselves, trade associations are likely to increase the level of 
structural cohesion in an industry. 
Taken together, these three reasons provide ample support for the idea that shared 
memberships in institutions such as trade associations increase the likelihood that two 
firms form a collaborative relation. Trade associations exert institutional pressures that 
integrate firms in an industry into a network of social and economic activity. Thus, I 
hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Firms that are share more memberships in trade associations 





Institutional Pressures towards Differentiation 
In addition to integration, I anticipate that institutions also exert pressures that 
emphasize distinctions. Feld (1981) argued long ago that the effect of shared activities on 
network patterns is contingent on the nature of the setting. McPherson and Ranger-Moore 
have shown that individuals‘ participation in membership based organizations depend on 
their characteristics  (1991). In the same vein, I expect that trade associations in order to 
build membership need to find internal mechanisms that differentiates between firms. 
Thus although institutions like trade associations in general can be expected to have a 
positive influence on collaboration in a field, I also predict that the effect is not uniform 
across pairs of firms because firms are likely to vary in way that they take part in the 
activities that occur in trade associations. 
Several braches of sociological thought supports the assertion that institutions 
distinguishes internally between subgroups that have different characteristics and 
interests. In the sociological literature on professions and organizations, institutional 
subdivisions and communities have been widely studied. Galaskiewicz (1985) has 
demonstrated that corporations with giving officers that are close to each other in social 
space are more likely to donate resources to the same non-profits. Dezalay and Garth‘s 
(1996) work on categories used to resolve business disputes finds that people in different 
groups had their own way to define and represent legal categories. Greenwood and 
colleagues (2002) shows that professional groupings mattered for the emergence of 





into one firm. In all of these studies, fields are organized around cliques of people with 
similar characteristics, interests, and world views. 
Abbott‘s (2001) theory about self-similar social structures formalizes the idea 
about populations and their sub-communities in an elegant way. He argues that the 
criteria that distinguish among people in a population also are important for 
understanding distinctions in more homogenous subsets of that population. Interesting the 
fraction of people that falls in different categories in the population tends to mirror the 
fractions that exist in the subgroup. He gives a couple of examples: ―Literature on cities 
separated ‗social organization and ‗social disorganization‘ only to find the latter category 
redivided by writers who saw a ‗social order of the slum‘. Studies of labor markets divide 
core and periphery only to find smaller cores and peripheries within each of these. 
Frazier‘s celebrated analysis of the black elite argued that the black bourgeoisie stood in 
much the same relation to the black mass as whites did to blacks in general‖ (p 158). If 
Abbott‘s theory about self-similar social structures is correct, we can expect that sub-
groupings that replicate the larger divides in a field form also in smaller and relatively 
homogenous institutions. Thus pressure towards differentiation is likely to moderate the 
pressures towards integration that come from shared membership in an institutions. If this 
prediction is true, shared memberships in an institution increase collaboration; yet it does 
so along the lines of social structures. Rather than building one fully integrated 
community, activities in institutions reinforce already existing clusters and cliques in the 
field.  
 I will now return to my discussion about trade association to develop this idea into 





level distinctions. I will focus especially on differences in geographic coverage, market 
niches, and status between firms. I propose that these dimensions are important for 
theorizing about distinctions inside trade associations. Geographic differences refer to 
distance in physical space, differences in the market niches is defined as separation in the 
targeted industries or clients, and status differences are disparate positions in the 
industry‘s internal hierarchy of prestige and symbolic recognition. Since activities in 
trade associations tend to take differences in geographical, market focus, and status 
differences into account, I expect that shared memberships in trade associations have a 
weaker effect on collaboration when firms are different along these dimensions.  
First, the role of geography in shaping networks has been highlighted in several 
recent studies. These works propose that firms that operate in different locales are less 
likely to encounter each other and even when they do, distant firms have low incentives 
to work together due to the uncertainty and difficulties in structuring such ties (Sorenson 
and Stuart 2001). Inter-firm network are therefore densest within regions even if ties to 
other locales often have a positive effect on firms (Whittington, Owen-Smith, and Powell 
2009). In addition to this direct effect of geographic differences on firms‘ relations, I 
expect that firms separated by physical space are less affected by shared membership in 
collective industry bodies such as trade associations. While many trade association 
similar to professional groups seek to generate ―invisible colleges‖ (cf. Crane 1972) 
where the role of physical distance is limited, we can still expect that the localized 
practices of many associations makes it likely that firms‘ participation in shared activities 





is weaker for firms that are separated by higher geographical distance. Building on this 
idea of institutional contingencies, I hypothesize:   
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2) Geographical differences decreases the effect of shared 
memberships in trade associations on collaboration 
 
Second, I expect that firms‘ activities in trade associations depend on their 
positions in the market place as defined by their target clients. To the extent that policy-
makers and other regulators tolerate cooperation (Dobbin and Dowd 1997; Schneiberg 
1999), firms with higher competition between them are more likely to be involved in 
shared activities than other firms because of their similarities and overlapping interests 
(Wholey and Huonker 1993).  I expect therefore that similar clients constitute another 
organizational basis that structures activities inside trade associations. Firms targeting the 
same kind of clients are likely to be involved in similar activities in the trade associations. 
Following my reasoning above, they are more likely to encounter each other and interact, 
and also more likely to be affected by the development of standards and shared identities. 
These mechanisms make the effects of shared membership on collaboration particularly 
strong for firms that serve similar clients.  Reversely, firms operating in different market 
segments are likely to be differently integrated in trade associations and less affected by 
shared membership in trade associations. I hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 3 (H3) Differences in market niches (target clients) decreases the 






Finally, I expect that firms‘ participation and role in trade associations depend on 
their status in the industry. Status can be defined as a firm‘s position in an existing 
structure of affiliations (Benjamin and Podolny 1999; Podolny 2001). Prior research has 
demonstrated that firms tend to select partners for collaboration that have similar status as 
themselves in the industry, especially when they are faced with high degrees of market 
uncertainty (Podolny 1994). I anticipate the similar processes occur inside trade 
associations. Firms of similar status are expected to participate in similar activities in the 
trade association and therefore more likely to form the informal connections that enable 
subsequent formation of a formal tie. One the other hand, firms that occupy different 
positions in the status hierarchy are less likely to interact inside a trade association 
despite shared membership. Following the same logic as the previous hypotheses, I 
expect that the effect of trade associations on collaboration decrease with status 
differences between the two firms. I hypothesize: 
 
Hypothesis 4 (H4) Differences in status decreases the effect of shared 
memberships in trade associations on collaboration 
Data and Method 
To test my hypotheses about the effects of shared institutions on network 
evolution, I draw on a dataset about the venture capital industry. I examine specifically 
how venture capital firms‘ collaboration on investments was affected by firms‘ shared 





least one investment in a U.S based company between the years 1981 and 1988. This 
time period is important for understanding the formation of the network structures that 
today are seen as crucial for the performance of venture capital firms. Venture capital 
firms had in the two proceeding decades increasingly collaborated with each other on 
investments as a result of new regulation and cultural changes in the industry 
predominately on the West Coast (see Chapters 2 and 3). During the 1980s, the practices 
of collaboration became institutionalized as the industry moved towards increased 
specialization. Prior work in the field of business history suggests that trade associations 
was one factor that contributed to the development of the modern venture capital 
industry, including its network structures (Reiner 1989). 
The dependent variable in this paper is a binary indicator set to one if a firm 
(partner 1) forms an investment relation with another firm (partner 2) in a given year. 
Data on all venture capital firms and their co-investments were collected from the 
VentureXpert database, which is a well-known source of information about the U.S. 
venture capital industry.  From these data, I identified all directed dyads that occurred 
between firms in each year.  To distinguish between the firm that initiates a relation and 
the firm that accepts an invitation for a co-investment, I follow a method developed by 
Sorenson and Stuart (2008) for analyzing the direction of co-investment relations in the 
venture capital industry. Venture capital deals are typically structured by a lead investor. 
The lead investor structures deal and makes decisions about which other firms to invite 
into the investment syndicate, if any. Firms in the two roles – lead investors and 
investment partners in the syndicate --  often have different characteristics and motives 





that initiates the relation (partner 1) and other firms participating in the investment as 
invited (partner 2) to account for the fact that the mechanisms that drive the formation of 
relations often are asymmetric. Empirically a lead investor is identified as a firm that was 
the sole financier in the first venture capital round. If more than one firm was involved in 
the first round, the lead investor is defined as the company that invested in the first round 
as well as all subsequent rounds. I exclude cases where no lead investor could be 
identified from my analyses.  
In the venture capital industry, similar to many other industries, the number of 
relations that actually exists is a very small fraction of all possible relations that could 
exist. In the period of interest, the number of relations that were forged between venture 
capital firms represents merely 0.041 % of the possible directed dyads among all active 
firms. I use therefore a rare event logit design to estimate the effects of my independent 
variables and control variables on the likelihood that two firms enter into an investment 
relation in a given year. For each year, I identify a risk set of relations that could have 
formed but did not. Following prior research (see e.g. Jensen 2003), I then sample ten 
non-realized relations for each relation that that did occur. Since the industry grew 
significantly during this time, I stratify my sampling scheme by year to maintain the 
temporal balance between relations that formed and did not form. I used the combined 
sample of realized and non-realized relations to estimate models.  
My first hypothesis (H1) predicts a positive effect of shared membership in trade 
association on the likelihood that the two firms collaboration on an investment. For each 
year and pair of firms, I generate a variable that measures the number of trade 





variables and controls, is lagged by one year to ensure temporal priority. Data on 
membership in trade associations were collected from printed volumes of Pratt‘s Guide to 
Venture Capital Sources, which is another well-known and respected source of data about 
venture capital firms. While Pratt‘s Guide has been published since 1970, information 
about membership in trade association was unfortunately not included until 1981. From 
Pratt‘s Guide (various issues), I collected annual data on each firms‘ memberships in four 
major associations. The associations are the American Association of Minority Enterprise 
Small Business Investment Companies (AAMESBIC), the National Association of Small 
Business Investment Companies (NASBIC), the National Venture Capital Association 
(NVCA), and the Western Association of Venture Capitalists (WAVC). Table 4.1 shows 
characteristics of the membership of the four trade associations in 1981 and 1987. The 
last column of Table 4.1 shows the averages for all firms in an industry, which I will use 






Table 4.1 Characteristics of Major Trade Associations in 1981 and 1987 
 
 
AAMESBIC and NASBIC were mainly composed of firms licensed by under the 
MESBIC and SBIC programs of the Small Business Administration (SBA). SBICs are 
financial intermediaries that can leverage their private capital with government funds. 
MESBICs are a subset of the SBIC industry that makes investments in companies with 





capital in 1981, but the association declined in membership during the 1980s as the 
number of SBICs decreased (see Chapter 2). AAMESBIC was a smaller association 
which can be explained by the fact that the MESBIC program was a relatively small 
segment of the SBIC program. One of the political goals behind the SBIC and MESBIC 
program was to make capital available to entrepreneurs in a range of industries and in 
different geographical regions (see Chapter 2). The diversity goal was reflected in the 
memberships of AAMESBIC and NASBIC. The status of NASBIC's member is close to 
the industry average, but the status of AAMESBIC's members was lower than the 
average, probably because many firms in this association were relatively small in size. 
NVCA is the general trade association in the venture capital industry. The 
association focused especially on private venture capital firms that were not licensed 
under the federal SBIC program. NVCA grew in membership during the 1980s and it had 
by 1987 surpassed NASBIC as the largest trade association in the industry. The targeted 
industries and regions of NVCA's members are similar to the industry at large. The 
members had however higher status than firms in average. Finally, WAVC organizes the 
interests of firms that invest in companies on the West Coast. The association has its 
roots in an informal network of investors in the San Francisco Bay Area. Yet while 
WAVC started as a small regional association, the trade association is still viewed as one 
of the most important organizations in the venture capital industry, especially during the 
early history (Reiner 1989). Members of WAVC tend to be higher status venture capital 
firms with a large share of investments in the IT industry. I use data about firms‘ 
membership in these four associations to test my first hypothesis suggesting that shared 





My next set of hypotheses examines how the effect of shared memberships in 
trade associations depends on differences in the firms‘ positions in the industry. 
Hypothesis 2 proposes a negative interaction effect between shared memberships and the 
geographical difference that exists between firms. I measure the geographical difference 
between each pair of firms by calculating the overlap in the regions that they invest in. 
This measure captures differences in firms‘ presence in different geographic locales and 
it is advantageous to measures based on the head quarter addresses since such data reduce 
the activities of a firm to a point in physical space. For each venture capital firm, I 
collected data on the states in which it made investments from the VentureXpert 
database. I used a ten year window to measure the firms‘ investment profile, since 
venture capital firms‘ investments are associated with long-term commitments. 
Moreover, venture capital firms‘ investment activities follow a cyclical pattern where 
some years are characterized by new investments and other years are focused on helping 
the companies that they invest in to grow (Gompers and Lerner 1999). The ten year 
window reduces missing data from period when the firms do not focus on new 
investments
5
.  I aggregated the state-level data to regional investment profiles defined as 
the proportion of each firm‘s investments that falls into each of the six regions that are 
used in the industry to describe investment patterns: Mid-Atlantic, Midwest, Northeast, 
Southeast, Southwest, and the West Coast. I thereafter calculate the difference between two 
firms‘ geographical investment profiles as: 
                                                 







where pik is proportion of partner 1‘s investments in a region k and pjk represents partner 
2‘s investments in the same region. The measure ranges from 0 to 2 where higher values 
represent greater differences between the two firms‘ investment patterns. I test 
Hypothesis 2 by interacting the variable for shared memberships in trade associations 
with the variable for geographical differences. The variable for geographical differences 
is centered on its mean to facilitate the interpretation of the main effect for memberships 
in trade associations.  
 Hypothesis 3 proposed a negative interaction effect between shared membership 
in trade associations and differences in target clients. Based on data from the 
VentureXpert database, I classified all companies that received funds from venture 
capital firms into eighteen different industries. The classification was based on the VEIC 
system which is a commonly used classification schema for venture capital investments. 
For each firm and year, I used a lagged ten year window to create a profile of the 
proportion of the firms‘ investments that fall into each industrial category. Similar to my 
measure of geographical differences, I calculate differences in targeted clients as the 
squared differences in the proportion of the firms‘ investments in each category and sum 
that over all categories.  
 My fourth and last hypothesis proposed a negative interaction between shared 
membership in trade association and status differences between the two firms. Following 
prior research in economic sociology and organization theory (Benjamin and Podolny 





firm is in the existing network of co-investing venture capital firms. For each year, I 
construct a cross-section of the co-investment network by using the history of investment 
made jointly by venture capital firms. A co-investment tie between two firms is assumed 
to last until the company that they invested in becomes publically traded or acquired by 
another company. I assume that investments without valid end dates last for ten years 
which is a common life span for venture capital investments especially during this 
historical period (Gompers and Lerner 1999). I measure each firm‘s status as its 
eigenvector centrality in this network of prior co-investments. Eigenvector centrality is a 
structural indicator of status which takes into account how many collaborators a firm has 
in a network as well as the centrality of those collaborators  (Bonacich 1987). I calculate 
the Eigenvector centrality measure with the Igraph package in R. For each pair of firms, I 
take the absolute value of the status difference and interact it with my measure of 
membership in trade associations to test Hypothesis 4.  
Beyond these variables, my analyses control for a set of other factors that are 
known to predict collaboration between firms. First, I control for a venture capital firm‘s 
tendency to make any investments in a given year. Firms that are less likely to invest are 
also less likely to form co-investment relations. I include two variables that measure the 
number of years since the most recent investment by the potential lead investors (Partner 
1) and the investment partner (Partner 2) respectively. I take the natural logarithm of this 
variable to reduce skewness. Aside from that, I also expect that the general tendency to 
invest depends on the age of the firm‘s youngest fund. Younger funds tend to have more 
resources available for making new investments. Limited partners with stakes in the fund 





life span. For these reasons, I expect that firms with a younger fund are more likely to 
invest, and consequently for co-investment relations. I calculate the age of all funds 
managed by the venture capital firm, and use the natural logarithm of the minimum age to 
control for this idea. 
I next control of effect of being a generalist compared to being a specialist in the 
venture capital industry. In the 1980s, several specialized venture capital firms were 
formed. These firms targeted their investments toward a specific form of companies for 
example biotechnology or software (Bygrave and Timmons 1992; Wilson 1985). The 
level of specialization can be anticipated to affect collaborative patterns in several ways. 
Generalists may have incentives to form relations with specialists because of specialists‘ 
unique knowledge about specific market niches. At the same time, specialists may also 
have incentives to form ties with other specialists and generalists, since they tend to be 
smaller firms without the resources that a firm need to make investments alone. To 
control for both possibilities, I measure the extent to which a firm can be considered a 
generalist with an inverse Herfindahl index summed over the eighteen industrial classes 
in the VEIC system. Also this variable is highly skewed and therefore transformed on a 
natural logarithm scale. Higher value of this measure indicates that the firm is generalist 
investing in a broad spectrum of industry classes.  
Venture capital firms also differ in the investment stage that they focus on. Early 
stage investments are associated with higher risk taking and such focus requires that the 
firm builds a different form of networks than if it were to focus on later investment 
rounds with lower levels of risk (Podolny 2001). Lerner (1994) has shown that lead 





on in later rounds to exploit the valuable information that they collect during the early 
high-risk rounds. To control for this finding from prior work, I construct a variable that 
measures the natural logarithm of the average investment round that the firm participated 
in the past ten years. I expect that firms with lower averages for the investment round are 
more likely to form a tie as a lead investor (Partner 1) and firms with higher values are 
more likely to be joining other firms as investment partners (Partner 2)  
Firms‘ likelihood to collaborate on an investment can also be explained by their 
prior performance. High performing firms are more likely to have resources for making 
any forms of investments, and they are also more attractive as collaborators. In the 
venture capital industry, firms generate financial returns when the companies that they 
invest in are acquired or issue shares in a public stock market. For each firm, I include a 
variable for the number of liquidity events (initial public stock offerings or acquisitions) 
that occurred in the firms‘ investment portfolio the prior year. I use the natural logarithm 
of this variable in my models since the count of liquidity also is a highly skewed variable. 
Finally I control for a set of dyadic characteristics that are known to influence the 
formation of relations among firms. Firms that are close to each other in the current 
network are more likely to form relations in subsequent years. Firms that are one step 
away from each other have experience from working together and are likely to form 
repeated ties due to trust and shared routines (Kogut, Urso, and Walker 2007), firms that 





each other from their shared third partner (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999), and so on
6
. Using 
my network data, I calculated the shortest path between each pair of venture capital firms 
in each year. The measure was calculated with the Igraph Package in R.  The shortest 
network path is undefined if the two firms are located in two disconnected network 
components. For these firms, I set the shortest path as one higher than the longest 
observed path between any pair of firms in that year.  
A large literature in network research has also shown that firms are more likely to 
collaborate with firms that are similar to themselves and reversely less likely to work 
with dissimilar firms. This tendency is referred to as homophily (Blau 1994; McPherson, 
Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). Similarly we know that venture capital firms are more 
likely to collaborate if the distance between them in social and geographical space is low 
(Sorenson and Stuart 2001; Sorenson and Stuart 2008). I control for the homophily 
argument by including the main effects of geographical differences, differences in 
targeted clients, and status distance into my models. I expect to find a negative effect of 
the three variables on the likelihood that two firms for a co-investment relation.  
Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 present descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations for 
all variables. From these data, I predict the likelihood that two firms collaborate on an 
investment with a series of logistic regressions. Statistical significance is assessed with 
two tailed tests using a 95 % confidence level. All models include yearly dummy 
                                                 
6 Prior research on social networks suggests that structural distance, similar to geographic distance, might 
have an exponential effect on the likelihood of tie formation (Kossinets & Watts, 2009). I find in a set of 
robustness analyses that a logarithmic transformation of my shortest path variable does not change my 
results. The effect of the shortest path on tie formation remains statistically significant (p<0.001) and the 
magnitude and standard errors of my independent variables replicates closely the models without the 





variables to control for period specific effects that may shape collaborative patterns such 
as the political, legal, and economic environment. In subsequent robustness analyses,  I 
also estimate my models with the rare logit module developed for Stata by Tomz and 
colleges (1999). Their estimation technique can generate more efficient estimates in data 
where the dependent variable is a rare event. I find qualitatively similar results to the 
findings presented in this paper. 
 































Collaboration is ubiquitous among venture capital firms. In the period of interest, 
848 new relations were formed in average in each year between lead investors and 
investment partners. In the middle of the 1980s, close to 95 % of all venture capital firms 
were interconnected by these co-investment relations into a large network component 
(see Chapter 3). My models estimates how firms in this context where influenced by their 
membership in trade associations when selecting investment partners. Table 4.4 
summarizes the findings from my empirical analyses. Consider first Model 1, which 
offers a baseline for my discussion by estimating the effects of my control variables 
without my independent variables. The results in this model support largely findings from 
prior research on inter-firm networks and the venture capital industry. I find that firms 
with longer durations since their last investment are less likely to form relations both as 
lead investors and investment partners. This effect is expected since those firms are less 
likely to make any investments, and therefore also less likely to form new investment 
relations. Similarly, I find that firms with older funds are less likely to collaborate. Also 
this result can be explained by the fact that such firms in general tend to make fewer 
investments. I find, however, no statistically significant effect on collaboration of being a 
generalist. The absence of this effect in the data from this earlier period is likely to reflect 
that specialization was a relatively new trend in the industry in the 1980s. In a separate 
study, I find that specialists in a later historical period of the venture capital industry (in 
the years from 1987 to 2005) were more likely to be both lead investors (partner 1) and 














Model 1 also shows partial support for the idea in the prior literature that 
collaborative patterns reflect the investment stage that the firm focuses on (Lerner 1994; 
Podolny 2001). While the tendency of firms focused on earlier stages to be lead investors 
is not statistically significant in the baseline model, I do find that firms are more likely to 
participate in investments as partners if they are more focused on later rounds. To little 
surprise, I find further that firms with higher performance in the prior year are more 
likely to form relations. Firms with more liquidity events (initial public offerings and 
acquisition) have a higher probability of being both lead investors and investment 
partners.  
Finally, I find statistically significant results for my four variables of dyadic 
characteristics. Firms that are further away from each other in the current network are 
less likely to form a relation. We know from prior work that firms tend to learn about 
possible collaborators from their current partners (Gulati and Gargiulo 1999), which in 
offers one explanation for why the shortest path length is associated with the likelihood 
of collaboration. As expected, I also find that firms with higher levels of geographical 
differences and industrial differences (target clients) are less likely to collaborate. This 
finding is supports prior work on homophily  (Blau 1994; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and 
Cook 2001) and research on distant ties in networks which has shown a negative effect of 
social and geographical differences on tie formation among venture capital firms 
(Sorenson and Stuart 2001; Sorenson and Stuart 2008). In contrast, the main effect of 
status differences is showing an unexpected positive effect on tie formation. While 





status strata (Podolny 1994), venture capital firms are more likely to work together if they 
occupy different positions in the status hierarchy. One possible explanation is that high 
status actors seek to  exploit power and information advantages (Piskorski and Snellman 
2004) by working with firms of lower status. 
In the subsequent models in Table 4.4, I test my four hypotheses about the 
institutional effects from trade associations on firms‘ collaborative patterns.  In Model 2, 
I start to test my hypotheses by entering the main effect of shared membership in trade 
associations into my analysis. I expect that firms that have more trade associations in 
common are more likely to form formal co-investment relations which each other, since 
trade associations facilitate informal encounters and interactions, standardize the 
technologies and practices used by firms, and shape firms‘ identities and cultural 
understandings. Model 2 offers support for this hypothesis. Before controlling for the 
idea that the effect of membership depends on firms‘ positions in the industry, I find a 
strong positive main effect of shared trade associations. The coefficient from the logistic 
regression (Model 2) translates into an odds ratio of 1.423 which means that firms that 
have three trade associations in common are 1.423
3
 = 2.89 times more likely to form a 
co-investment relation than two firms without any trade associations in common.  The 
finding supports the idea that trade associations are institutions that integrate firms in an 
industry and foster structural cohesion. 
Next I test the idea that the positive effect of shared membership in trade 
associations depend on firms‘ positions in the industry. I theorized that firms‘ roles and 
activities in trade associations reflect their individual characteristics and not only their 





associations with my variable for geographical differences. If my theory about 
institutional contingencies is correct, then I expect to find a negative interaction between 
these two variables. I find marginal statistical support (P<0.1) for this argument using a 
two-tailed test. While the evidence is not conclusive, I take this result to suggest that 
geographical differences may moderate the effect of shared membership in trade 
association on the formation of co-investment relations. 
Stronger empirical evidence is found for Hypothesis 3 and 4.  I find in Models 4 
and 5 that differences in targeted clients and differences in the firms‘ status have negative 
interaction effects with shared memberships in trade associations.  The positive effect on 
the likelihood of collaboration coming from shared membership in trade associations 
decreases rapidly if the two firms occupy different horizontal and vertical positions in the 
industry. These results remain relatively stable in the full specified model (Model 6) 
despite some concerns about multicollinearity coming from multiple interaction effects 
with the variable for shared memberships in trade associations.  
The contingencies caused by differences in target clients and status are not only 
interesting from a theoretical perspective, but their magnitudes are also striking.  
Consider Figure 4.1 which graphs the probabilities that two firms form a co-investment 
relation by the number of shared trade associations and different levels of differences in 
targeted clients. The probabilities are estimated from the fully specified Model 6 and 
assume that all control variables are at their mean level. The first set of bars shows that 
firms with similar positions in the industry (defined as differences one standard deviation 
below the mean) are significantly more likely to form a co-investment relation if they 





effect of shared membership in trade associations decreases rapidly if the two firms are 
more different from each other. When the differences between the two firms are high 
(defined as one standard deviation above the mean), the effect shared membership in 
trade associations has disappeared fully.  
 
Figure 4.1 Probability that a Co-investment Relation Forms by Number of Shared Trade 
Associations and Different Levels of Differences in the Industry of the Firm‘s Clients 
 
A similar pattern is shown in Figure 4.2 which presents the probability of 
collaboration by shared trade associations and different levels of status differences. The 
effect of trade associations is strongest when the two firms are of similar status, and 
decreases then rapidly for firms when larger status differences. Once again, I find that the 
positive effect of shared trade associations on the likelihood of collaboration diminishes 





that firms that have differences at a level of one standard deviation above the mean, no 
longer are likely to form co-investment relations as a result of their shared membership in 
trade associations. 
 
Figure 4.2 Probability that a Co-investment Relation Forms by Number of Shared Trade 
Associations and Different Levels of Status Differences 
 
Discussion and Implications  
The overall message from these analyses is that the pattern of relations that 
venture capital firms build based on their experience in trade associations depends on the 
firms‘ position in the industry. We can formulate this finding in a more general language: 
Institutional pressures towards integration often go hand in hand with pressures towards 





co-investment relations. The effect of institutions depended however on differences in 
targeted industries and status. Thus institutions contributed to the development of 
cohesive homogenous cliques of interconnected firms.  Figure 4.3 demonstrates this 
development over time by graphing the average of the pair-wise difference for firm that 
form co-investment relations in the period from 1975 to 1990. I find that differences 
between connected firms decreased significantly during this period. The trend can be 
observed for all three dimensions that I discuss in this paper: geographic coverage, 
targeted industries, and states. In other words, networks were increasingly tying together 
firms that were similar to each other in clusters. I believe that institutional pressures that 
integrate similar firms while leaving dissimilar firms unaffected by their participation in 








Figure 4.3 Average Pairwise Differences for Firms that Formed Co-investment Ties, 1975-1990  
 
 One interesting finding form my analysis is that trade association in the venture 
capital industry excreted differentiating pressures despite the fact that these trade 
associations were relatively homogenous institutions. My data shows that venture capital 
firms that shared more trade associations tend to be more similar to each other that firms 
that do not share membership in associations. Consider the graph in Figure 4.3 which 





associations. Two sample t-tests comparing the level of differences for each trade 
association my analysis (except AAMESIC which has a small sample size), demonstrate 
that the pattern holds for each individual association included in my analysis. The limited 
diversity inside trade association is consistent with several studies in sociology that 
shows that people often select into social contexts with similar others (Kossinets and 
Watts 2009; McPherson and Ranger-Moore 1991). Despite homogeneity in my empirical 
context, distinctions occur inside institutions. This finding has important implications 
since we can anticipate that institutional pressures towards differentiation are even more 
salient in context of higher diversity. 
 






Several theoretical contributions extend from my results to the literatures on 
network evolution in sociology and organization theory. First, I make an empirical 
contribution to the study of inter-firm networks by highlighting the effects of trade 
associations on inter-firm networks. My work extends the literature on the effects of 
contextual factors on network formation (Feld 1981; Kossinets and Watts 2006; Rivera 
2010; Rosenkopf, Metiu, and George 2001; Rosenkopf and Schleicher 2008; Sorenson 
and Stuart 2008) by demonstrating that trade associations form one important social 
setting that integrates firms in an industry and increases the likelihood that they forge 
collaborative relations with each other. This finding is not surprising given that trade 
associations often list networking and community building as two explicit goals of their 
activities. Still the effect of shared membership in trade associations is seldom included 
in research of firms‘ networks despite the strength of this effect which makes it likely that 
prior studies underestimate the degree to which contexts induces network ties among 
firms. 
Second and more importantly for broader theory, I find support for my idea that 
the pressures towards integration stemming from institutions go along with pressures that 
separate between members that are situated in different positions in the field. I argued at 
the front end of this paper that the two co-existing pressures of integration and 
differentiation result from the fact that institutions seek to meet members‘ collective 
goals while also speaking to their individual interests. This means that effects of 
institutions on collaborative patterns are multifaceted and contingent. Understanding how 
institutions shape network structures require attention to counteracting pressures as they 





often see as mechanisms of inclusion, cohesion and community building, can 
simultaneously be perceived by insiders as mechanisms for stratification and 
differentiations. 
Together these findings offer insights for literatures on network evolution by 
pointing to fruitful directions for future research. My focus on a single industry during a 
relatively short time span suggests that it would be valuable to test these ideas in other 
empirical contexts. Venture capital is an industry where networks are very cohesive and 
explicitly valued by firms. I expect that firms under such conditions are especially 
attuned to informal networking opportunities in shared social settings such as trade 
associations. Individuals and firms in contexts where networks are less important may in 
contrast be less affected by shared membership. This idea could be tested in comparative 
analysis since we know that industries (Rosenkopf and Schilling 2007) as well as regions 
(Fleming, King, and Juda 2007; Powell, Packalen, and Whittington Forthcoming) differ 
in respect to the relations that exist among firms. 
Another fruitful direction for future research is to extend the idea of institutional 
pressures and contingencies to include multiple shared contexts. Feld (1982) theorized 
long ago that people are simultaneously embedded in multiple social foci including their 
family, various organizations, and associations. He predicted that social foci vary in their 
degree of compatibility and thus they amplify or diminish each other‘s effect on 
relational structures. If Feld‘s theory holds, I expect the effects of institutional 
contingencies on social and economic networks are even more ubiquitous that I have 
demonstrated in this paper. Contingencies are then not just a result of competing 





compatible those arrangements are with other contexts for shared activities including for 
example educational sites, political arenas, and the family.  
Conclusion 
An important regularity of many social and economic networks is their tendency 
to be organized around local cliques with sparse overlaps between them. In this paper, I 
examine how institutional pressures can explain the development of such network 
patterns. I focus especially on trade associations as a central institutional base for 
integration and differentiation in an industry. One the on hand, activities in trade 
associations largely depend on their members‘ feeling that they belong to a community. 
On the other hand, they are organized around distinctions among the firms in the industry 
and reinforce existing structural differences in the industry. I take the potential tensions 
between integrating and differentiating institutional pressures as a point of departure for 
explaining the conditions under which the effects of trade associations on collaboration 
are amplified or diminished. As expected, I find that firms with shared membership in 
trade associations are more likely to collaborate with each other. More surprising are the 
results showing that the effect of memberships in the same trade associations on the 
formation of co-investment relations decreases as the two firms are located in different 
positions of the industry. The effect is especially pronounced for firms that invest in 
different segments of the market and firms that are of different status. There is also some 
marginal support for the idea that geographical differences weaken the effect of shared 
membership in trade associations. These findings offer support for my general claim that 





and contingent. The networks that we observe in industries are results of many social 
processes than operate simultaneously to induce some collaborative opportunities and 





CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS 
Economic sociologists have for many years been interested in collaborative 
relations among firms, and their ramifications for various organizational outcomes. This 
theoretical perspective explains why trust and reciprocity develop between some 
competing firms, whereas conflict and opportunism characterize the interactions between 
other organizations. In this dissertation, my goal has been to explain how the institutions 
that govern firms‘ relations form in a young industry, and how institutional factors 
influence firms‘ likelihood to collaborate and their choice of partners. Chapter 2 explored 
how firms can use arguments grounded in professional expertise in political arenas to 
influence the institutions that structure inter-firm relations. Chapter 3 explained how 
firms‘ collaborative decisions can be influenced by manages‘ prior career experiences in 
established industries. Chapter 4 demonstrated the effects of trade associations on 
formation of relations between firms, and contingencies in such effects. In my work, 
professional expertise, public policy, established industries, and trade associations 
represent different forms of institutional arrangements that firms in a young industry are 
influenced by when they make decisions about how and when to form collaborative 
relations with partners, if at all. 
  In this concluding chapter, I will discuss the broader theoretical significance of 
my empirical results. Especially, I will point to a series of important extensions that 





inter-firm relations in a young industry. My discussion will be organized around three 
themes that are central to my empirical papers. First, I will discuss the idea that firms 
often are exposed to multiple institutional pressures. Second, I will attend to possible 
interactions between those institutional pressures.  Third, I will offer some thoughts 
about the long-term consequences of the processes that I examine in this dissertation. 
Speaking to a large literature in economic sociology, I will discuss how my institutional 
focus contributes to knowledge about the evolution of inter-firm networks.  
The Effects of Multiple Institutional Pressures 
My dissertation shows that firms in young industries often are exposed to multiple 
institutional pressures that shape how firms interact and form relationships with each 
other. These institutional pressures can come from many different sources. Chapter 2 
emphasized two sources of institutional pressures: public policy and professionals. Firm 
in the early history of the private venture capital industry and the SBIC industry were 
governed by regulation created for large financial institutions especially investment banks 
and commercial banks. I demonstrated how policy-making processes tried to address 
perceived misfits between the regulation that was inherited from older financial sectors 
and the new activities that SBICs and private venture capital firms developed. Private 
venture capital firms were able to position themselves as a group with professional 
expertise and were thereby able to influence the policies that governed their financing ties 






Chapter 3 also pointed to the importance of institutions inherited from established 
industries and the mindset of people in an industry. In this paper, managers carried ideas 
about how to make strategic decisions when moving from established industries into the 
young venture capital industry. I showed that the background of managers influenced 
whether or not firms decided to collaborate with other venture capital firms or invest 
alone in small businesses. This stresses the importance of examining established 
institutional arrangements including those outside the focal industry to understand how 
firms perceive and form collaborative ties with each other.  
Finally, Chapter 4 added trade associations to the list of institutional influences in 
young industries. Trade associations are interesting institutions in young industries since 
they are formed by firms in the industry. Trade associations differ in this respect from for 
many other institutions for example public policy that firms need to negotiate with other 
interest groups. The analysis in Chapter 4 addressed how firms‘ participation in trade 
associations contributed to the development of networks of cohesive homogenous 
subgroups with relatively few overlaps. I focused on trade associations‘ institutional 
capacity to integrate and differentiate between firms in a field. 
Public policy, professionals, established industries, and trade association offer 
four example of important institutions that shape how young industries develop. More 
institutions could be added to the list for instance educational institutions, law firms, the 
news media, and consultants. I anticipate that multiple institutional forces are central to 
the development of many new industries. The exact list of institutions that matter in an 






Possible Interactions between Institutional Pressures 
In fields with multiple institutions, questions about institutional interactions are 
important. The empirical chapters indicate the possibility that institutional influence from 
different sources may push firms in different directions which in turn may generate a set 
of institutional tensions that need to be resolved in the young industry. Research about 
new industries needs therefore to address when institutional pressures interfere with each 
other. My dissertation examines these questions most clearly in the chapter about trade 
associations. The chapter shows how the differentiating pressures arising from firms‘ 
individual characteristics and interests functioned as a counterforce to the integrating 
pressures that most prior research has associated with trade associations. I find that the 
positive effect of shared membership in trade associations on collaboration strongly 
declines for more different firms. The effect was fully nullified when firms‘ difference 
was one standard deviation above the mean.  
Different institutional arrangements can also complement each other. Thus 
research on young industries also needs to ask when different institutions amplify each 
other to generate stronger institutional effects on firms‘ behaviors. Chapter 2 offers some 
insights that point to the possibility of positive interaction between institutions that is 
cases where two institutional forces operate in tandem and strengthen each other. I 
showed in this chapter how groups that claimed professional expertise were able to 
influence regulatory arrangements. While much organizational analysis following 
DiMaggio and Powell‘s (1983) work have treated the normative influences of 





that influence organizations, I show that arguments grounded in professional expertise 
can align with the concerns of policy-makers. Under such circumstance where institutions 
complement each other, I expect that institutions will have a particularly strong effect on 
firms‘ behaviors.  
By attending to multiple institutional pressures and institutional contingencies and 
interactions, my work proposes that young industries can develop along many possible 
trajectories. The model of small business financing that dominates contemporary capital 
markets was one of many possible outcomes. From the three empirical chapters, we learn 
about other alternatives that did not take hold despite being viable options during the 
early days of the industry. Chapter 2 showed that that the state could have played a more 
important role in the field of small business financing. The SBIC industry was an 
organized effort by the government to create an industry that would provide financing to 
companies in diverse industries and regions. Chapter 2 proposed also that both SBICs and 
private venture capital firms could have been institutions more similar to other financial 
firms such as investment banks or commercial banks. SBICs and private venture capital 
firms struggled for several decades to influence regulatory arrangements that would allow 
them to develop business models that differed from traditional financial sectors. 
Chapter 3 offers more evidence for the idea that small business financing could 
have developed in many other directions. Venture capital firms are today known for their 
frequent collaboration on investments in companies. Co-investment relations form a 
network that facilitates the flow of information and resources. I showed in this paper that 
firms with more commercial bankers had a lower propensity to collaborate on 





to the venture capital industry could have been less important if commercial bankers had 
a stronger influence on the industry. Finally, Chapter 4 shows how trade associations 
influenced collaborative patterns in the venture capital industry. Without shared 
institutional contexts such as trade association, the level of cohesion and clustering in the 
networks of the venture capital industry had probably been much lower.  
The Long-term Consequences: Towards Stable Network Structures 
 I will end my concluding remarks by returning to one of the main points in the 
introduction chapter. At the outset of this thesis, I suggested that neither the 
characteristics of networks, nor the effects of collaborative relations on organizational 
outcomes are universal. I pointed to recent empirical studies which have documented that 
network structures and the benefits that firms can derive from their social and economic 
relationships varies between regions (Owen-Smith and Powell 2004), between countries 
(Hamilton and Biggart 1988; Xiao and Tsui 2007) and over time (Gulati and Higgins 
2003; Mizruchi, Stearns, and Marquis 2006; Powell, White, Koput, and Owen-Smith 
2005). I believe that institutional processes during the early days of an industry contribute 
to our understanding of such variations in networks and their effects. 
The focus on emergence and change leads me finally to the question about when a 
young and dynamic industry develops more stable network structures. While my 
empirical papers do not explicitly examine the processes that stabilize certain industry 
structures, I still believe that my work generates some theoretical propositions about this 
topic. Building on my discussion in the prior section, I believe that resolution of 





structures. From literature in organization theory, we know that firms in fields with 
institutional tensions tend to engage in practices that are likely to lead to continued social 
change. Some of them are driven by individuals‘ and social movements‘ desire to 
transform the industry, but change can also occur from conservative individuals‘ and 
firms‘ desires to stay in power (Padgett and Ansell 1994). Moreover I expect that the 
formation of firmer industry boundaries is necessary condition that needs to be met 
before the collaborative structures in an industry become stable and self-reproducing.  
My analysis stresses that young industries have porous boundaries and under such 
conditions the industry will remain a high level of diversity and change. Self-reproducing 
collaborative patterns are likely to develop in industries with firmer boundaries that allow 
firms to develop taken-for-granted beliefs and practices. 
My work indicates the value of a future research agenda that pays more attention 
to history and contextual factors to understand interactions among firms. Returning to 
Granovetter‘s classical 1985 for a final time, we learn about the importance of applying a 
sociological perspective like the one develop in this dissertation to understand market 
processes. Granovetter argued firms‘ differential embeddedness in social networks 
explains the opportunities and constraints that firms experience. In my thesis, I have 
emphasized that differential embeddedness in networks depends on the broader set of 
social influences that exist in an industry. In young industries, we have to attend to a 
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